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ARTICLES

THE HIGH COST OF FREE SPEECH:
ANTI-SOLICITATION ORDINANCES, DAY
LABORERS, AND THE IMPACT OF
“BACKDOOR” LOCAL IMMIGRATION
REGULATIONS
KRISTINA M. CAMPBELL*
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines how local efforts to regulate the activities of immigrants, while not regulation of immigration per se, can have a substantial and
detrimental effect on the civil rights of immigrants and Latinos. It will
discuss how day laborers—individuals, mostly Latino men, who seek shortterm employment in public fora—are routinely targeted by state and local
governments, federal immigration authorities, anti-immigrant activists, and
the general public as a symbol of the employment of unauthorized aliens.
While many day laborers are lawfully present or have authorization to work
in the United States, some people assume day laborers to be “illegal aliens”
due to the high-profile nature of their job search—which usually involves
waiting on corners in front of “big-box” stores or in nearby labor centers for a
potential employer to offer them work—and therefore implicitly deserving of
the derision and scrutiny that accompanies such a categorization. As such,
day laborers are a visible and vulnerable population, subject to discriminatory treatment on the basis of real or perceived immigration status on a daily
basis.
However, despite the abundance of public scorn and contempt directed at
day laborers, federal courts have uniformly upheld their right to solicit

* Assistant Professor and Director, Immigration and Human Rights Clinic, University of the
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law. B.A., Saint Mary’s College, 1997; J.D., Notre
Dame Law School, 2002. I would like to thank the UDC David A. Clarke School of Law for the
summer research grant that made it possible to complete this Article. © 2010, Kristina M. Campbell.
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employment in public fora and have repeatedly struck down anti-solicitation
ordinances designed to chill their First Amendment free speech rights.
Immigrants’ rights advocates have successfully litigated on behalf of day
laborers in federal courts—particularly in California and Arizona—and, as a
result of this litigation strategy, day laborers have continued to be able to seek
and obtain day work. Yet despite these repeated vindications of their
constitutional rights in court, the day-to-day reality is that day laborers
continue to be harassed by law enforcement, businesses, and private citizens,
as the public nature of their job search often leads them to be unfairly
categorized as the faces of illegal immigration, as nuisances, and as threats to
public safety.
This paper explores the gap between the day laborers’ legal successes and
their continuing struggle for respect and dignity as employees and human
beings, and searches for a remedy in the law that will more forcefully
advance day laborers’ fight for equality. Part I gives an overview of the cases
concerning day laborers and their free speech right to seek work, and whether
or not anti-solicitation ordinances are content-based, content-neutral, or
commercial speech. Part II discusses the ways in which day laborers have
empowered themselves—not only by challenging the anti-solicitation ordinances directed at them, but by organizing to ensure better wages and
working conditions. Part III argues that the First Amendment decisions
upholding day laborers’ constitutional right to solicit employment—while
significant and important holdings that reaffirm the fundamental right of all
persons, even those with unpopular messages, to speak and to be heard—are
largely pyrrhic victories for the day laborers themselves, as they do not
address the underlying problems of discrimination, racial profiling, and
selective enforcement that are inherent in day work.
Part IV discusses the tension between the strategy of the First Amendment
litigation and the larger struggle for justice and dignity for day laborers, and
highlights other litigation strategies that have been used to challenge “backdoor” local regulations of immigration. I argue that the short-term, piecemeal
successes that have resulted from challenging state and local anti-solicitation
laws, while important as matter of policy, have done little to actually advance
day laborers’ struggle for equality in a lasting, tangible manner. Because day
laborers are perceived to be undocumented immigrants, anti-solicitation
ordinances and other laws targeting day laborers are really “backdoor”
attempts by state and local governments to regulate immigration. As such,
challenging these laws as First Amendment violations of day laborers’ free
speech rights, while allowing the workers to continue to solicit employment
in public fora, fails to provide them with a meaningful remedy. This is due to
the pernicious motives underlying the creation and passage of antisolicitation laws targeting day laborers—racism, nativism, and discrimination based on alienage and national origin—and I attempt in this section to
identify other meaningful ways to address the root causes of such ordinances
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in addition to First Amendment litigation. Finally, Part V explores how the
successes day laborers have enjoyed in court in vindicating their free speech
right to seek employment can be used to develop additional novel legal
theories and potential remedies. I argue that in order to meaningfully combat
“backdoor” immigration regulations, immigrants’ rights advocates must
engage in legal and policy work that will translate into a more practical,
every day benefit for the men and women working “on the corner.”
I.

ANTI-SOLICITATION ORDINANCES AND DAY LABORERS: ANALYZING THE
PROPER LEVEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
right of freedom of speech to all persons.1 The term “persons” includes
undocumented immigrants, who are entitled to the constitutional protections
contained in the Bill of Rights once they are physically present within the
borders of the United States.2 Most forms of speech engaged in by persons in
traditional public fora,3 including solicitation speech, have been determined
by the courts to be protected First Amendment activity, subject to reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions by the government.4 However, in order
to comply with the Constitution, such governmental restrictions must be
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternative channels for communication.5

1. See U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
2. Aliens—even undocumented aliens—have the same rights as United States citizens guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, as they are “persons” within the meaning of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214 (1982) (holding that undocumented alien children are entitled to a
free public education because the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to all
persons, “whether citizens or strangers,” who are within the boundaries of the United States); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)
(recognizing aliens as “persons” guaranteed due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1063-65 (9th Cir. 1995)
rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that undocumented immigrants in the United
States are protected by the First Amendment); see also David A. Martin, Graduated Application of
Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 85
(“The Bill of Rights uses terms of broader scope (e.g., ‘person,’ ‘the accused’) that generally include
aliens.”). But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (inferring that the
“people” protected by the Bill of Rights are only those who are “part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community”).
3. Courts have interpreted “traditional public fora” to include places such as sidewalks, parks,
and other public places where individuals freely gather. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org.,
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (stating that in places which by long tradition or by government fiat have
been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply
circumscribed, and at one end of the spectrum are streets and parks, which “have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”).
4. The United States Supreme Court has held that “even in a public forum, the government may
impose reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions” on protected free speech activities. See Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
5. Id.

4

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

Despite the fact that most courts have held that anti-solicitation speech
targeting day laborers is protected by the First Amendment,6 there is some
controversy over whether anti-solicitation ordinances should be considered
commercial speech, which is entitled to less constitutional protection.7 In
addition to the question over whether anti-solicitation ordinances would be
more properly analyzed as commercial speech, there is also a split of
authority regarding whether such restrictions are content-based restrictions
on speech subject to strict scrutiny, or content-neutral restrictions that are
analyzed under the lower standard of intermediate scrutiny.8 This section will
discuss the various court challenges to local anti-solicitation ordinances
targeting day laborers,9 and the different constitutional analyses used by
courts considering such challenges on First Amendment grounds.
A. Content-Based Speech Analysis
1. ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas (ACLU II)
Federal courts that have heard First Amendment challenges to antisolicitation ordinances have generally held that such ordinances, while
entitled to full free speech protection under the United States Constitution,
were properly analyzed as content-neutral restrictions on speech.10 In analyzing anti-solicitation ordinances, courts have had to determine whether the
restrictions on solicitation in question were passed in response to legitimate
governmental concerns unrelated to suppressing a particular message—and
thus truly content-neutral—or whether they were passed in an attempt to
restrict particular individuals from speaking, which would be an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech.11
In 2006, in its decision in ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas (ACLU
II),12 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an ordinance passed
by the City of Las Vegas prohibiting solicitation in a public forum was a
content-based restriction on speech.13 Reviewing the Las Vegas ordinance

6. See infra Part III.
7. The Supreme Court has held that speech that is primarily commercial in nature is not fully
protected speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)
(holding that commercial speech, while protected by the First Amendment “from unwarranted
governmental regulation,” is subject to greater limitations than can be imposed on expression not
solely related to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience).
8. See infra Part I.A. and I.B. (collecting cases).
9. While not all of the cases covered in this Article were targeted in whole or in part against day
laborers, all of the cases discussed herein concerned constitutional challenges to local antisolicitation ordinances and were heavily relied upon as authority in subsequent litigation challenges
attempts to restrict solicitation speech by day laborers.
10. See infra Part II.B. (collecting cases).
11. See ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas (ACLU II), 466 F.3d 784, 794 & n.10 (9th Cir.
2006) (noting that bans on acts of solicitation are content-neutral, while bans on words of solicitation
are content-based).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 800–01.
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using a strict-scrutiny analysis,14 the Ninth Circuit struck down the city’s
anti-solicitation ordinance as an unconstitutional content-based prohibition
of protected speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.15 The court held that the ordinance was a content-based restriction on
speech because it prohibited the distribution of handbills “requesting financial or other assistance,” but permitted other types of handbills.16 The court’s
holding that the Las Vegas ordinance was content-based, which at the time
was seen as an outlier decision of an unusually liberal panel, set the stage for
future challenges to other anti-solicitation ordinances across the Ninth
Circuit.
2. Jornaleros Unidos de Baldwin Park v. City of Baldwin Park
Although ACLU II did not concern an anti-solicitation ordinance directed
at day laborers, its holding was relied upon by day laborers and their
advocates in challenges to laws that attempted to restrict day laborers from
soliciting employment in traditional public fora.17 One of the first such cases
was Jornaleros Unidos de Baldwin Park v. City of Baldwin Park, which was
filed in the Central District of California in 2007.18
In response to claims of alleged harassment by day laborers soliciting
work near the Home Depot store in Baldwin Park,19 in early July 2007 the

14. Courts applying a strict scrutiny analysis must determine whether the challenged law serves a
compelling governmental interest, and that the law is narrowly tailored to serve as the least restrictive
means for achieving the government’s stated interest. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
15. ACLU II, 466 F.3d at 794.
16. Id.
17. See Answering Brief for Appellees at 10, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of
Redondo Beach, 475 F.Supp.2d 952 (C.D. Cal. 2006). On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Plaintiffs relied
on the court’s holding in ACLU II to affirm the holding of the district court, which found that the City
of Redondo Beach’s anti-solicitation ordinance was unconstitutional. Although the district court held
that the ordinance was content-neutral and used an intermediate scrutiny analysis, the Plaintiffs’ brief
urged the court to adopt the content-based analysis of anti-solicitation ordinances used in ACLU II.
However, in June 2010, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court, holding that Redondo
Beach’s anti-solicitation ordinance was a reasonable time, place and manner restriction, and that it
was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. See Comite de Jornaleros de
Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussed infra, Part
I.B). In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th
Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs have indicated that they will seek en banc review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
See Press Release, National Day Labor Organizing Network, Redondo Beach Day Laborers Speak
Out: “We Will Not Be Criminalized,” Request Rehearing on Recent 9th Circuit Decision (June 10,
2010), available at http://www.ndlon.org/index.php?view⫽article&catid⫽59%3Apress-releases&
id⫽319%3Aredondo-beach-day-laborers-speak-out-we-will-not-be-criminalized&option⫽com_
content&Itemid⫽198.
18. Jornaleros Unidos de Baldwin Park v. City of Baldwin Park, No. 07-CV-4135-ER (C.D. Cal.
July 17, 2007) (order granting preliminary injunction) (on file with author).
19. See Jennifer Woodard Maderazo, Baldwin Park California Seeks to Ban Day Laborers,
VIVIRLATINO, Nov. 13, 2007, available at http://vivirlatino.com/2007/11/13/baldwin-park-californiaseeks-to-ban-day-laborers.php (noting that “[c]laims that laborers were harassing customers near the
Home Depot on Puente Avenue prompted an approval in June of an ordinance that barred laborers
from soliciting employers in parking lots and on sidewalks unless they left a 3-foot buffer for
pedestrians”).
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City Council passed an ordinance that prohibited solicitation of employment
on city sidewalks unless there was a three-foot buffer for pedestrians at all
times.20 In its findings regarding the necessity of the anti-solicitation ordinance in the City of Baldwin Park, and in an attempt to rebut accusations that
the Ordinance was a content-based restriction on speech, the City Council
stated that the presence of persons soliciting employment on public rights-ofway “create a threat to the public health and safety by causing pedestrians or
persons requiring assisted mobility to have to leave appropriately paved and
segregated areas.”21 The findings continue:
It is the intention of the City Council in adopting this Ordinance to
strike a balance between the needs of vehicles and pedestrians, including disabled individuals, for safe passage and the constitutional rights
of persons to utilize for commercial solicitation those areas which have
been determined by law to be public forums for such purpose.22
The assertion by the City Council that the intent of its anti-solicitation
ordinance was to balance the need for “safe passages and the constitutional
rights” of day laborers—in addition to the disingenuous concern for disabled
persons—is belied by evidence to the contrary. For example, in the same
paragraph in which it sets forth these alleged concerns, the City refers to the
right to solicit employment as “commercial speech,” an alternative characterization of free speech rights that foes of day laborers have sought to bring
into the mainstream in order to limit their ability to utilize public fora to
solicit employment.23 Despite the City Council’s attempt to frame the issue
as one of commercial speech, the Ordinance was challenged in federal court
as an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech.24 On July 17,
2007, United States District Judge Edward Rafeedie, relying primarily on the
Ninth Circuit’s holding in ACLU II, preliminarily enjoined the Baldwin Park
Ordinance.25 Following Judge Rafeedie’s injunction, the City of Baldwin

20. See BALDWIN PARK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 97.136-137 (repealed Aug. 15, 2007),
available at http://baldwinpark.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id⫽10&clip_id⫽750&meta_
id⫽77080. As approved by the Baldwin Park City Council on June 6, 2007, Ordinance 1302 read in
pertinent part, “It is unlawful for any person to utilize any pedestrian area for the purpose of soliciting
if such use results in there being less than three (3) feet of free and clear passageway in, along, and
through such pedestrian area.” Id. § 97.137(a).
21. See Baldwin Park, Cal., Ordinance 1302 § G, (June 6, 2007), available at http://baldwinpark.
granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id⫽10&clip_id⫽750&meta_id⫽77080.
22. See Baldwin Park, Cal., Ordinance 1302 § H, (June 6, 2007), available at http://baldwinpark.
granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id⫽10&clip_id⫽750&meta_id⫽77080.
23. See infra Part I.B.6. (describing attempts to categorize solicitation speech as commercial
speech, which is entitled to less constitutional protection than other types of speech under the First
Amendment).
24. See Jornaleros Unidos de Baldwin Park v. City of Baldwin Park, No. 07-CV-4135-ER (C.D.
Cal. July 17, 2007) (order granting preliminary injunction) (on file with author).
25. See id. at 3 (“Here, the challenged sections are not content neutral . . . . In this case, the
restriction on solicitation is content-based because one must look at the content of the speech to
determine if it is solicitation.”).
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Park unanimously repealed the Ordinance and promised to explore other
means of addressing tensions surrounding day laborers that did not infringe
upon their constitutional rights.26
3. Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek
In September 2007, the Town of Cave Creek, Arizona, a suburb of
Phoenix, passed an anti-solicitation ordinance27 directed at day laborers who
had been soliciting work in public fora in the Town for several years.28 A
violation of the ordinance constituted a civil traffic offense and a potential
civil penalty not to exceed $250 for each violation.29 Plaintiffs, who were day
laborers who wished to solicit work in the Town of Cave Creek, filed suit to
enjoin the ordinance on the grounds that it violated their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to free speech.30
District Judge Roslyn Silver, in granting the Plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction, determined that under ACLU II, the Cave Creek
ordinance was a content-based restriction on speech and was therefore
unconstitutional.31 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Silver noted that, like
the Las Vegas ordinance, the Cave Creek ordinance permitted certain types of
solicitation speech but prohibited others types of disfavored speech based on
the content of its message.32
The Town of Cave Creek defended the constitutionality of its antisolicitation ordinance by arguing that the ordinance was content-neutral
under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in ACORN v. City of Phoenix.33 Judge
Silver distinguished the ACORN ordinance by noting that, in contrast to the
Cave Creek ordinance, it did not single out certain types of solicitation

26. See Baldwin Park Repeals Day Laborer Limitation Law, CBS2/KCAL9 (Aug. 16, 2007),
available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q⫽cache:iCQMRiRVFTQJ:cbs2.com/
local/2.534708.html⫹Baldwin⫹Park⫹Repeals⫹Day⫹Laborer⫹Limitation⫹Law&cd⫽1&hl⫽
en&ct⫽clnk&gl⫽us&client⫽firefox-a.
27. See CAVE CREEK, ARIZ., TOWN CODE § 72.17(C) (2010) (effective Oct. 24, 2007) (making it
unlawful for “[any] person [to] stand on or adjacent to a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to
solicit, employment, business or contributions from the occupant of any vehicle”).
28. See, e.g., Margaret Harding & Beth Duckett, Cave Creek Grapples With Day Labor Issue,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 13, 2007, available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/
0613laborers0613.html. The Episcopal Church that had hosted the day labor center in Cave Creek for
many years ultimately closed its day labor center. See Beth Duckett, Cave Creek Church Closes Day
Labor Center, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 5, 2008, available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/
0104daylabor0105-ON.html.
29. CAVE CREEK, ARIZ., TOWN CODE § 10.99(B) (2010).
30. See Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, 559 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1031 (D. Ariz. 2008).
31. Id. at 1032 (“Plaintiffs do not argue that the Town enacted the Ordinance because of its
disagreement with the message solicitation-speech conveys. Rather, Plaintiffs assert that the
Ordinance is content-based because it bans only certain types of solicitation speech. The Court agrees
with Plaintiffs.”).
32. Id. (“[I]n this case, the Ordinance differentiates based on the content of speech on its face. It
prohibits solicitation speech, but not political, religious, artistic, or other categories of speech. It also
prohibits solicitation on the topics of ‘employment, business or contributions,’ while allowing
solicitation of votes or ballot signatures.”).
33. Id. at 1033.
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speech on its face for differential treatment.34 The court also noted that while
the ordinance at issue in ACORN targeted a specific act of solicitation—a
form of aggressive solicitation known as “tagging”—the Cave Creek ordinance singled out words of solicitation, which the Ninth Circuit in ACLU II
held was the crucial distinction for determining whether an anti-solicitation
ordinance is content-based or content-neutral.35
Finally, the court in Cave Creek held that even if the ordinance was not
content-based, it would still fail to pass constitutional muster under a
content-neutral analysis, because the Town could not demonstrate that it was
a narrowly tailored time, place, and manner regulation of speech.36 Although
the court found that the Town did have a significant interest in promoting
traffic safety, which was its stated goal in passing the ordinance, Judge Silver
concluded that the Town had not proffered any evidence that day laborers
soliciting work in the Town of Cave Creek had any impact on traffic safety.37
In fact, based on the Town Council minutes submitted to the court as
evidence of the relationship between its anti-solicitation ordinance and traffic
safety, the court found that the true motive of the Town appeared to be the
desire to rid the Town of “illegal immigrants,” which in reality has little or no
bearing on traffic safety.38
4. Berger v. City of Seattle
In 2009, three years after its decision in ACLU II and following the district
courts’ decisions in Baldwin Park and Cave Creek, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, decided the case of Berger v. City of
Seattle,39 and once again considered when an anti-solicitation ordinance is an
unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech. The court in Berger
struck down the City of Seattle’s anti-solicitation ordinance prohibiting street
performers from “actively soliciting donations” at the Seattle Center, which
was defended by the city as a regulation on conduct, not speech.40 In
rejecting that argument, the Ninth Circuit held that because the Seattle
ordinance restricted the “medium and manner” of solicitation speech, it was
34. Id. (“[T]he Phoenix ordinance does not single out any group or the content of any speech. The
ordinance applies evenhandedly to every organization or individual, regardless of viewpoint, which
would desire to solicit contributions, business, or employment from the occupants of vehicles
traveling on Phoenix streets.”).
35. Id. (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has subsequently characterized the regulation at issue in ACORN as
one banning the act of solicitation, not the words of solicitation.”) (citing ACLU II, 466 F.3d at 764).
36. Id. at 1034.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1034–35 (“The Town has provided no evidence that traffic safety is endangered by day
laborers soliciting employment from vehicle occupants. Although the Town asserts that the minutes
of the Town Council meetings held on June 18 and September 24, 2007 demonstrate that the
Ordinance was adopted to address traffic safety concerns, not a single person at either hearing
mentioned traffic safety. To the extent that people mentioned a ‘safety’ concern, it appears to be in
reference to the safety of people from illegal immigrants, not traffic safety.”).
39. Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009).
40. Id. at 1035–36, 1051.
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not a prohibition on conduct and was thus protected by the First Amendment.41
While the Seattle ordinance was not enacted specifically to prohibit day
laborers from soliciting employment, like anti-solicitation ordinances targeting day laborers, the statute at issue in Berger prevented street performers
from “actively solicit[ing] donations . . . by live or recorded word of mouth,
gesture, mechanical devices, or second parties.”42 The court held that, while
the City of Seattle’s stated purpose for its regulation of protecting patrons of
the Seattle Center from harassment was content-neutral, the ordinance was
nonetheless a content-based restriction on speech because, like the Las Vegas
ordinance in ACLU II, it singled out speakers requesting donations for
differential treatment based on the idea being expressed.43
Despite the significance of the court’s decisions in ACLU II and Berger,
the Ninth Circuit’s First Amendment jurisprudence regarding the proper
standard for analyzing anti-solicitation ordinances remains far from clear.
Although the court has attempted to clarify when an anti-solicitation ordinance is content-based as opposed to content-neutral, and when such regulations address conduct rather than speech, there remains no bright-line rule for
evaluating constitutional challenges to laws restricting speech by day laborers and others who wish to solicit in public fora.44
B. Content-Neutral Speech Analysis
As stated above, anti-solicitation ordinances have traditionally been analyzed as content-neutral restrictions on speech. It is well-settled that a
regulation affecting speech-related activities is content-neutral if it “serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”45 However, in order
to pass constitutional muster, a content-neutral restriction on speech must not
“single[] out particular content for differential treatment.”46 This section will
discuss several cases concerning anti-solicitation ordinances that the federal
courts have determined to be facially content-neutral.
1. ACORN v. City of Phoenix
The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN),
a non-profit political action organization, often engaged in the practice of
soliciting contributions for its cause through a process known as “tagging.”47
41. Id. at 1051.
42. Id. at 1050.
43. Id. at 1051 (noting that the Seattle ordinance prohibited street performers from requesting
donations, but did not prohibit them from other communications with patrons of the Seattle Center).
44. See discussion infra Part II.B.
45. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
46. Berger, 569 F.3d at 1051; see also ACLU II, 466 F.3d at 794.
47. See ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 1986).
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“Tagging” is an aggressive form of solicitation, which “usually involves an
individual stepping into the street and approaching an automobile when it is
stopped at a red traffic light. The individual asks the occupants of the vehicle
for a contribution . . . and distributes a slip of paper, or ‘tag.’”48 In 1983,
following a threat of arrest and citation by law enforcement officials in
Phoenix for violating a state law prohibiting certain types of solicitation,49
members of ACORN filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona, contending that the practice of soliciting contributions
from occupants of vehicles was protected under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution.50
In response to this suit, and apparently in response to comments made by
the district judge hearing the case,51 the City of Phoenix passed its own
anti-solicitation ordinance in 1984,52 and the constitutionality of that ordinance became the focus of ACORN’s suit going forward.53 The district judge
ruled that the Phoenix ordinance was constitutional,54 and ACORN appealed
the judgment in favor of the city to the Ninth Circuit.
The first issue considered by the Ninth Circuit in ACORN’s appeal is
whether or not “streets” are traditional public fora where expressive activity
is entitled to First Amendment protection.55 Although the court expressed the
view that streets are traditional public fora, it also stated that “[t]o conclude
that streets may generally be categorized as traditional public fora may not
require us to also conclude that the streets at all times and under all
circumstances are susceptible to characterization as a perpetual public forum
uniquely available for free expression.”56 The Ninth Circuit also noted that
“courts have recognized a greater governmental interest in regulating the use
of city streets,”57 but in the case of the Phoenix ordinance, the court
ultimately decided that it was not necessary for the court to determine

48. Id.
49. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-796 (1996) (prohibiting pedestrians from walking “along and
upon” a roadway adjacent to a sidewalk and from standing in a roadway “for the purpose of soliciting
a ride from the driver of any vehicle”).
50. ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F. Supp. 869, 870 (D. Ariz. 1985), aff ’d, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th
Cir. 1986).
51. ACORN, 798 F.2d at 1262. (“[T]he district judge expressed concern that Arizona Revised
Statute Sec. 28-796, as well as other traffic statutes and ordinances relied upon by Phoenix, might not
apply to solicitation from occupants of motor vehicles. The judge suggested that ‘the City could enact
an ordinance . . . that would tell people you can’t carry on solicitation or commercial activities or
otherwise, in an intersection or in an area adjacent to an intersection.’”).
52. See Phx., Ariz., Ordinance 36-131.01 (May 9, 1984) (“No person shall stand on a street or
highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions from the occupants
of any vehicle.”).
53. ACORN, 798 F.2d. at 1262.
54. ACORN, 603 F.Supp. at 872.
55. ACORN, 798 F.2d. at 1265.
56. Id. at 1266.
57. Id. at 1267 (citing NAACP, Western Region v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1355 (9th
Cir. 1984)).
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whether public streets are public fora, but assumed that they are public fora.58
Following this determination, the court held that the Phoenix antisolicitation ordinance was content-neutral and a reasonable time, place, and
manner regulation.59 The court determined that the ordinance was contentneutral because it did not single out any group or the content of any speech,60
and held that the ordinance was reasonable in light of the City of Phoenix’s
significant interests in regulating the flow of traffic and harassment of
occupants of vehicles.61 The court stated that, because the ordinance was
“aimed narrowly at the disruptive nature of fund solicitation from the
occupants of vehicles” and did not restrict communication of ideas, the City’s
regulation did not run afoul of the First Amendment.62 The court also gave
weight to the City’s obligation to regulate traffic and ensure public safety, and
found that the ordinance as drafted left open ample alternative channels of
communication for ACORN and others who wished to disseminate ideas in
traditional public fora.63
For many years, the ACORN decision remained the leading Ninth Circuit
case interpreting the reasonableness of government anti-solicitation ordinances. Its relatively narrow holding—that regulation of solicitation activities such as “tagging” is constitutional so long as it focuses on conduct rather
than speech—gave both cities and persons wishing to engage in expressive
activity in public fora a roadmap for crafting an ordinance that struck a
balance between protecting the interests of the government while, at the same
time, ensuring that First Amendment free speech protections remained in
place. However, subsequent legal challenges to other cities’ anti-solicitation
ordinances that were ostensibly modeled after the Phoenix ordinance would,
at least in the Ninth Circuit, significantly further muddle the jurisprudential
waters.
2. Xiloj-Itzep v. City of Agoura Hills
Although it arose in California state court rather than United States District
Court, Xiloj-Itzep v. City of Agoura Hills is significant because it was an early
unsuccessful challenge to an anti-solicitation ordinance brought on behalf of

58. Id. (“[U]nder the circumstances of this case, we need not decide whether public streets are
perpetual public fora. Consequently, we intimate no views on the validity of the novel argument that
streets are not public fora while simultaneously in use by motor vehicles. We conclude that the
Phoenix ordinance can be justified even under the more rigorous standards applied to the regulation
of expression in traditional public fora. We assume for the purposes of this case that the Phoenix
ordinance applies to activities occurring within a public forum.”).
59. Id.
60. Id. (“The ordinance applies evenhandedly to every organization or individual, regardless of
viewpoint, which would desire to solicit contributions, business, or employment from the occupants
of vehicles traveling on Phoenix streets.”) (citing Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648–49 (1981)).
61. See id. at 1268–70.
62. See id at 1268–71.
63. See id. at 1270–71.
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day laborers in Agoura Hills, California.64 In March 1991, in response to
recent alleged problems with day laborers congregating on city streets and
sidewalks in order to seek work,65 the City of Agoura Hills passed two
ordinances prohibiting the solicitation of persons in vehicles.66 However, in
July 1991, shortly after the passage of these two ordinances, the City
repealed them and replaced them with a new, more comprehensive ordinance.67 Following the passage of the city’s new anti-solicitation ordinance,
a group of day laborers sought to have the law enjoined as an unconstitutional

64. Xiloj-Itzep v. City of Agoura Hills, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
65. Id. at 882 (“[I]n late 1989 and early 1990, large numbers of men, up to 100 a day, began
congregating at the intersection of Kanan and Agoura Roads in the City, apparently in the hope of
obtaining day work. The City then began receiving complaints concerning certain conduct by some of
the men who were congregating near that intersection. These complaints included running out into
traffic, swarming cars, distracting motorists who made sudden swerves and stops to respond to them
and interfering with ingress and egress to the parking lot of the small shopping center . . . at that
intersection.”) There were also complaints of “littering, fighting, drinking, public urination and
defecation in the parking lot, cat-calling at women and use of shopping area and nearby areas for
sleeping and living encampments.” Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 883–85. The pertinent parts of the Ordinance read as follows:
“ORDINANCE NO. 91-191
“AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF AGOURA HILLS RELATING TO THE SOLICITATION OF EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS OR CONTRIBUTIONS OF MONEY OR OTHER
PROPERTY WITHIN THE CITY, AMENDING THE AGOURA HILLS MUNICIPAL CODE
AND DECLARING THE URGENCY THEREOF
“The City Council of the City of Agoura Hills does hereby ordain as follows:
“Section 1. Article III, Chapter 2 of the Agoura Hills Municipal Code is hereby amended by
amending Sections 3208 and 3209 to read:
“3208 Definitions. For the purposes of Sections 3209 and 3210, the following meanings shall
apply: . . . .
“(b) ‘employment’ shall mean and include services, industry or labor performed by a person
for wages or other compensation or under any contract of hire, written, oral, express or
implied.
“(c) ‘solicit’ shall mean and include any request, offer, enticement, or action which
announces the availability for or of employment, the sale of goods, or a request for [funds]; or
any request, offer, enticement or action which seeks to purchase or secure goods or
employment, or to make a contribution of money or other property. As defined herein, a
solicitation shall be deemed complete when made whether or not an actual employment
relationship is created, a transaction is completed, or an exchange of money takes place.
“3209 Prohibition of Solicitation in Public Right-of-Way.
“(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, while standing in any portion of the public
right-of-way, including but not limited to public streets, highways, sidewalks and driveways,
to solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions of money or other
property from any person travelling in a vehicle along a public right-of-way, including, but not
limited to public streets, highways or driveways.
“(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, while the occupant of any vehicle, to solicit, or
attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions of money or other property from a
person who is within the public right-of-way, including, but not limited to a public street,
highway, sidewalk or driveway.’
“Section 2. Article III, Chapter 2 of the Agoura Hills Municipal Code is hereby amended by
adding thereto a new Section 3210 to read:
“‘3210 Prohibition of Solicitation in Unauthorized Locations Within Commercial Parking
Areas.

2010]

HIGH COST OF FREE SPEECH

13

violation of their First Amendment right to seek work in a public forum.68
In April 1994, the Second District of California Court of Appeal affirmed
the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction of the City’s antisolicitation ordinance.69 In holding that “it has long been established that a
City’s police power includes the power to regulate commercial activity on its

“(a) No person shall solicit or attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions of
money or other property, from a location within a commercial parking area other than an area
within or served by such parking area which is authorized by the property owner or the
property owner’s authorized representative for such solicitations. This section shall not apply
to a solicitation to perform employment or business for the owner or lawful tenants of the
subject premises.
“(b) For purposes of this Section, ‘commercial parking area’ shall mean privately owned
property which is designed or used primarily for the parking of vehicles and which adjoins one
or more commercial establishments.
“(c) This Section shall only apply to commercial parking areas where the following occurs:
“(i) The owner or person in lawful possession of the commercial parking area establishes a
written policy which provides area(s) for the lawful solicitation of employment, business, or
contributions of money or other property, in locations which are accessible to the public and
do not interfere with normal business operations of the commercial premises;
“(ii) A copy of said policy is submitted to the City Manager to be maintained in City files;
and,
“(iii) The owner or person in lawful possession of the commercial parking area has caused a
notice to be posted in a conspicuous place at each entrance to such commercial parking area
not less than eighteen by twenty-four inches in size with lettering not less than one inch in
height and not to exceed in total area, six square feet. The notice shall be in substantially the
following form:
“‘It is a misdemeanor to engage in the solicitation of employment, business or contributions
of money or other property in areas of this commercial parking lot which are not approved for
such activity by the property owner.’”
“Section 3. Section 3211 of Article III, Chapter 2 of Agoura Hills Municipal Code is hereby
repealed.
“Section 4. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or portion of this ordinance is
for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the decision of any court of competent
jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this
ordinance. The City Council of the City of Agoura Hills hereby declares that it would have
adopted this ordinance and each section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or portion
thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more section, subsection, sentence, clause,
phrase or portion may be declared invalid or unconstitutional.
“Section 5. There are existing provisions in the Agoura Hills Municipal Code which regulate
the solicitation of employment, business or contributions within the public right-of-way and,
subject to certain requirements, in commercial parking areas. This ordinance changes the
existing provisions in significant respects. Both the existing provisions and this ordinance are
necessary to protect the public from traffic hazards and other dangers which may result from
solicitations of employment, business and contributions in certain locations. Absent the
immediate effectiveness of this ordinance, it is likely that there will be significant confusion
regarding which provisions are in effect, which may result in increased traffic safety and other
problems. The immediate effectiveness of this ordinance is therefore necessary to prevent
confusion as to which regulations are in effect and to protect the public safety and welfare.
This ordinance is an urgency ordinance and shall take effect immediately upon adoption.
Id. (citing Agoura Hills, Cal., Ordinance No. 91-191 (July 24, 1991)).
68. Id. at 881. (“Appellants contend the Ordinance was adopted to prevent them from seeking
daywork in the City and prevents them from congregating on City sidewalks in violation of their First
Amendment rights, the equal protection clause and the right to work.”).
69. Id. at 894.
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streets and sidewalks,”70 the Court of Appeal stated that “there is no merit in
appellants’ claims that the Ordinance is facially invalid.”71 The appeals court
went on to determine that the ordinance was content-neutral and dismissed
the argument that the ordinance was content-based because “the . . . cases
cited by appellants to support their claim that the Ordinance is a content
based regulation are equally inapposite as the conduct prohibited by the
regulations being reviewed in those cases depended on the content of
speech.”72 Additionally, relying on ACORN and other Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeal determined that the City’s anti-solicitation ordinance “serves a legitimate public interest, is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest and leaves alternative channels for communication.”73
Despite this defeat in the California appellate court, the challenge to the
City of Agoura Hill’s anti-solicitation ordinance was just the beginning of the
fight for day laborers in California. Though it would be many years before
advocates saw success with their argument that such ordinances were
content-based restrictions on speech,74 in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the
federal courts in California began to accept that although such ordinances
were content-neutral, many of them were not narrowly tailored time, place
and manner restrictions on such speech.
3. Coalition for Human Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles
(CHIRLA) v. Burke
In 1998, CHIRLA v. Burke,75 a challenge to an anti-solicitation ordinance
targeting day laborers, was filed in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. The law challenged in CHIRLA was an
ordinance passed by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors in 1994
that prohibited solicitation of employment by individuals in public fora in
Los Angeles County.76 One of the plaintiff groups in the CHIRLA litigation
was an informal group of organized day laborers, Sindicato de Trabajadores

70. Id. at 887.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 889, n.5.
73. Id. at 889 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474 (1988); ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1267 (9th Cir. 1986)).
74. See supra Part I.A.
75. Coal. for Human Immigrant Rights of L.A. v. Burke (CHIRLA), No. CV 98-4863GHK(CTX), 2000 WL 1481467 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2000).
76. See L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE §§ 13.15.011-.15.012 (2009) (“It shall be unlawful for any
person, while standing in any portion of the public right-of-way, including but not limited to public
streets, highways, sidewalks and driveways, to solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business, or
contributions of money or other property, from any person traveling in a vehicle along a public
right-of-way, including, but not limited to, public streets, highways or driveways. The provisions of
this Section shall only be operative in the unincorporated areas of the County . . . It shall be unlawful
for any person, while the occupant of a moving vehicle, to solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment,
business, or contributions of money or other property, from a person who is within the public
right-of-way, including but not limited to a public street, highway, sidewalk, or driveway. The
provisions of this Section shall only be operative in the unincorporated areas of the County.”).
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por Dia.77
Unlike subsequent litigation challenging anti-solicitation ordinances, both
of the lead plaintiffs—the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los
Angeles (CHIRLA) and the Sindicato—conceded that the Ordinance was a
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of speech.78 However, the
plaintiffs alleged that the Ordinance nonetheless violated their First Amendment right to free speech because the Ordinance was not narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, which in this case the County argued
was the amelioration of the “secondary effects” of solicitation of employment in public fora by day laborers.79
Although the district judge found that the County had presented some
admissible evidence regarding the detrimental “secondary effects” of public
solicitation of employment, and that such problems may be sufficient to rise
to the level of a “significant interest” of the County, the court nonetheless
found that the presence of these factors alone did not justify the necessity of
the anti-solicitation ordinance unless the County could also show that the
Ordinance was narrowly-tailored.80 In holding that the County’s ordinance
was not narrowly-tailored, the court stated that the regulation in question was
“exceptionally broad” and, as such, it “burden[ed] a substantial amount of
speech that has not been shown to cause the feared harms to traffic flow and
safety.”81
The CHIRLA decision is important because it distinguishes the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in ACORN by noting the crucial difference between
solicitation speech that occurs on a public right-of-way such as a sidewalk
and that which occurs in the street, and how the difference in such locations
fundamentally affects the appropriate constitutional analysis of anti-

77. See CHIRLA, 2000 WL 1481467 at *1.
78. Id. at *2.
79. Id. at *3 (“The County contends that streetside solicitation of the sort restricted by the
Ordinance causes several dangers or harmful “secondary effects.” It argues that the solicitation
targeted by the Ordinance compromises the safety of pedestrians and motorists using the public
right-of-way, including the solicitors themselves, those solicited, and people uninvolved in the
solicitation. The County further contends that the targeted solicitation impedes traffic flow, blocks
traffic lanes, and makes it more difficult for drivers to obey traffic laws by distracting them from
paying attention to the road. The County also asserts that “the activities in question place a significant
strain on police resources because of the influx of traffic and day workers to areas where solicitations
occur,” and the Ordinance is meant to “moderate the need for additional police.” Finally, the County
contends that the targeted solicitation causes a deterioration of the quality of life in the areas where it
occurs because (1) motorists are beset by people seeking work, (2) would-be workers jump uninvited
into vehicles; and (3) solicitors harass passersby, deposit trash, and urinate and defecate in public.”).
80. Id. at *4 (“While much if not all of this evidence may not be admissible in court to prove that
the targeted speech causes the asserted problems, it is the type of evidence upon which the County
may rely. This does not mean, however, that the County has shown that it had a sufficient basis to
enact a speech restriction as broad as the Ordinance challenged here . . . The test for narrow tailoring
places a burden on the County to show that a “reasonable fit” exists between its legitimate interests
and the terms of its Ordinance.”).
81. Id. at *6–9.
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solicitation ordinances.82 Although this application of the holding in ACORN
would not be uniformly applied by the Ninth Circuit in the future,83 the
court’s analysis in CHIRLA provided a good foundation for the continued
fight by advocates to create precedential decisions affirming the free speech
right of day laborers to solicit employment in public fora.
4. Comite de Jornaleros de Glendale v. City of Glendale
Following the decisions in CHIRLA and City of Agoura Hills, another
significant challenge to a local anti-solicitation ordinance was brought
against the City of Glendale, California in 2004. The case, Comite de
Jornaleros de Glendale v. City of Glendale, involved a First Amendment
challenge to a law that prohibited day laborers from soliciting employment in
public fora in Glendale, a suburb of Los Angeles.84 The Ordinance, § 9.17.0130
of the Glendale Municipal Code, made it unlawful for a person to “solicit or
attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions of money or
property” from persons in vehicles on public roadways.85 As in previous
cases challenging anti-solicitation ordinances like the one in this instance, the
Plaintiffs alleged that the Glendale Ordinance was an unconstitutional
content-based restriction on speech that was vague and not narrowly tailored
to serve an important government interest.86
After granting a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the
ordinance,87 Judge James Otero of the United States District Court for the
Central District of California entered a permanent injunction against the City
of Glendale, prohibiting it from enforcing its anti-solicitation ordinance.88
Although Judge Otero determined that the Ordinance was content-neutral,
and that the City had a legitimate interest in its stated concerns of “reducing
traffic congestion, assuring the safety of drivers and pedestrians, and preserving and improving . . . the quality of life of its residents and business
owners,”89 he found that the Ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve

82. Id. at *9 (“Solicitors who run into the street or stand on the curb and aggressively hail moving
vehicles surely cause the harmful effects that the County fears, and the record contains evidence
sufficient for the County to conclude that such solicitation has in fact occurred. But the record does
not support the County’s decision to ban all vehicle-addressed solicitation, defined as broadly as the
Ordinance defines it here.”).
83. See Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178, 1190
(9th Cir. 2010).
84. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1, Comite de Jornaleros de
Glendale v. City of Glendale, No. CV 04-3521 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2005) available at http://
www.maldef.org/assets/pdf/first_amended_comp_for_injc_and_declaratory_relief.pdf.
85. See GLENDALE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.17.0130(A), available at http://www.ci.glendale.
ca.us/gmc/9.17.asp. Subsection (B) also made it unlawful for persons in parked vehicles to solicit
persons for employment in the same public fora. Id. § 9.17.0130(B).
86. See First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 84 at 4.
87. See Comite de Jornaleros de Glendale v. City of Glendale, No. CV 04-3521 SJO (Ex), 2005
U.S. Dist LEXIS 46603, at *2 (C.D. Cal May 13, 2005).
88. Id. at *20.
89. Id. at *8.
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those goals.90 He also found that the Ordinance did not leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of information, and thus found that
the City’s ordinance was likely to impermissibly chill solicitation speech in
violation of the First Amendment.91 Although the City of Glendale initially
appealed Judge Otero’s decision to the Ninth Circuit, the parties filed a
stipulation to dismiss the case in August 2008, following an agreement with
the City to adopt an Amended Ordinance that did not infringe upon the
constitutional rights of those who wish to solicit employment in a public
forum,92 thus ending the case and securing another litigation victory on
behalf of day laborers.
5. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach
Perhaps the most important case concerning the constitutionality of
anti-solicitation ordinances arose from the litigation surrounding the law
attempting to regulate the solicitation of employment by day laborers in
Redondo Beach, California. In 1986, the City of Redondo Beach passed an
anti-solicitation ordinance93 in response to the increased presence of day
laborers soliciting work in the city.94 The Redondo Beach ordinance, which
the drafters claimed was modeled after the City of Phoenix law sustained by
the Ninth Circuit in ACORN,95 barred acts of solicitation directed at persons
in vehicles without regard to the content of the message.96 However, the
ordinance remained largely unenforced until 2004, when City of Redondo
90. Id. at *16 (“[T]he Ordinance is not narrowly-tailored . . . As Plaintiffs note, jugglers,
acrobats, pet-walkers, and children of any age are free to stand on Glendale’s curb just so long as they
do not solicit ‘by use of the spoken word, bodily act or gesture.’ . . . There is simply no ‘reasonable
fit’ between a concern about people standing on curbs and a ban on solicitation speech alone.”).
91. Id. at *19–20.
92. See Comite de Jornaleros de Glendale, No. 05-56372 (9th Cir. dismissed per stipulation Aug.
20, 2008); see also Comité de Jornaleros de Glendale v. City of Glendale, California, MALDEF
(Sept. 26, 2010), http://www.maldef.org/immigration/litigation/glendale_v_jornaleros/.
93. The anti-solicitation ordinance in question provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person to
stand on a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business, or contributions
from an occupant of any motor vehicle. For purposes of this section, “street or highway” shall mean
all of that area dedicated to public use for public street purposes and shall include, but not be limited
to, roadways, parkways, medians, alleys, sidewalks, curbs, and public ways.” REDONDO BEACH, CAL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE § 3-7.1601 (2010). In 1989, the City of Redondo Beach added subsection (b), which
states: “It shall be unlawful for any person to stop, park or stand a motor vehicle on a street or
highway from which any occupant attempts to hire or hires for employment another person or
persons.” Id. § 3-7.1601(b).
94. See Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178, 1181
(9th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the genesis of the Redondo Beach anti-solicitation ordinance, the Ninth
Circuit stated that “[a] memorandum from the city attorney to the mayor explained that ‘the City has
had extreme difficulties with persons soliciting employment from the sidewalks along the Artesia
corridor over the last several years . . . . There can be little question that traffic and safety hazards
occur by this practice . . . the ‘ordinance was designed to alleviate sidewalk congestion and traffic
hazards which occurred when large numbers of persons congregated on the sidewalks during the rush
hours to obtain temporary employment.’”
95. Id. (“Some eight months after we decided ACORN, Redondo Beach’s city attorney proposed
that the city adopt an ordinance ‘identical to one recently approved by the 9th circuit court of
appeals.’”). See generally ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1986).
96. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d at 1181.
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Beach police officers, posing as potential employers, began targeting day
laborers soliciting work and citing them for violating the city’s antisolicitation ordinance.97
Unlike the ordinance at issue in ACORN, the Redondo Beach ordinance
specifically prohibits solicitation from persons on “sidewalks”98 in addition
to “streets” and “highways,” which Plaintiffs contended made the law an
unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.99 In the
alternative, Plaintiffs argued that even if the ordinance was content-neutral, it
was still an unconstitutional restriction on solicitation speech because it was
a narrowly-tailored time, place, and manner restriction.100
In April 2006, the district court agreed with the plaintiffs’ alternative
argument and ruled that Redondo Beach’s anti-solicitation ordinance, though
content-neutral, was invalid; the court thus permanently enjoined the ordinance from being enforced.101 Specifically, the court held that the ordinance
was not narrowly tailored to promote the City of Redondo Beach’s interests
in traffic flow and safety, and that it failed to establish the existence of ample
alternative channels of communication.102 The City of Redondo Beach
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the grant of attorney fees awarded to
Plaintiffs by the district court was stayed pending appeal.103
In June 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court
and held that Redondo Beach’s anti-solicitation ordinance is a valid time,
place and manner restriction.104 Writing for the 2-1 majority, Circuit Judge
Sandra Ikuta first rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the Redondo Beach ordinance
was content-based. Stating that “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between
the Phoenix and Redondo Beach ordinances,” Judge Ikuta held that “we are
bound by our determination in ACORN that the Phoenix ordinance was
content neutral because it was aimed narrowly at barring acts of solicitation
directed toward the occupants of vehicles . . . and was not related to any
particular message or content of speech.”105 Judge Ikuta dismissed Plaintiffs’
argument that the inclusion of “sidewalks” as prohibited solicitation loca-

97. See id. at 1182 (“In October 2004, Redondo Beach undertook “an enhanced effort” to enforce
the Redondo Beach ordinance at these two intersections. Throughout October and November 2004,
Redondo Beach police officers, sometimes posing as potential employers, arrested multiple persons
for violating subsection (a) of the ordinance, and cited one person for violating subsection (b).”).
98. See REDONDO BEACH, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 3-7.1601 (2010).
99. The plaintiffs made the argument that the Redondo Beach ordinance was a content-based
restriction at both the district court and on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. See Comite de Jornaleros de
Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo, 475 F.Supp.2d 952, 956 (C.D. Cal. 2006) rev’d, Comite de
Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City Of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010).
100. Id. at 960.
101. Id. at 970.
102. Id. at 968.
103. See Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th
Cir. 2010).
104. Id. at 1180.
105. Id. at 1187 (citing ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1267, 1273 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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tions in the Redondo Beach ordinance distinguished it from the Phoenix
ordinance in ACORN by asserting that “this difference is immaterial because
ACORN interpreted the Phoenix ordinance as applying to persons soliciting
vehicles from the sidewalk, as well as those soliciting from the street.”106
In reaching its conclusion that the Redondo Beach anti-solicitation ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction, the Ninth Circuit
majority also stated that the City of Redondo Beach “has not prevented
people from ‘leafleting empty parked cars, approaching cars already legally
parked in the street, or holding up signs to be seen by passing cars’” and that
“[n]o one has been arrested for communicating a message by means that did
not adversely affect traffic.”107 These facts, Judge Ikuta concluded, evince
that “the Redondo Beach ordinance is . . . aimed at acts, does not single out
particular ideas for differential treatment,” and is therefore contentneutral.108
Additionally, in holding that the Redondo Beach ordinance is narrowly
tailored, the Ninth Circuit majority held that the City of Redondo Beach has a
substantial interest in promoting traffic flow and safety.109 A regulation is
narrowly tailored if it “promotes a substantial government interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”110 The Supreme Court has
held that “[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than
necessary to achieve the government’s interest, however, the regulation will
not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s
interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.”111 The Ninth Circuit found that, because the Redondo Beach ordinance
was intended to address traffic and safety concerns,112 it was analogous to the
ordinance at issue in ACORN; the court stated that “[n]othing in the record
suggests that solicitation for employment raises a less significant risk of
disruption in traffic flow than solicitation for contributions.”113
The view articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Redondo Beach—that the
narrowly-tailored analysis in ACORN controls because there is little fundamental difference between the solicitation of employment and solicitation of
contributions on a city’s stated interest in regulating traffic flow—is a
significant departure from the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of anti-solicitation
ordinances in ACLU II and Berger. Although the Ninth Circuit concluded in

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The district court had also found that the City of Redondo Beach had a substantial
interest in regulating traffic flow and safety; however, the court nonetheless found the Redondo Beach
ordinance invalid because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. See Comite de Jornaleros
de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo, 475 F.Supp.2d 952, 966 (C.D. Cal. 2006) rev’d, Comite de
Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City Of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010).
110. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 98–99 (1989).
111. Id. at 800.
112. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d at 1190.
113. Id.
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both of those cases that the ordinances in question were content-based rather
than content-neutral regulations on speech, the opinion of the panel that the
ordinance in question in Redondo Beach is not distinguishable from the City
of Phoenix’s ordinance in ACORN not only reverses the district court’s ruling
that the Redondo Beach ordinance “sweeps in a much larger amount of
‘solicitation’ speech and speech-related conduct than the ordinance at issue in
ACORN,”114 but it goes against the significant weight of authority in the
Ninth Circuit interpreting the constitutionality of anti-solicitation ordinances.115 Because of the significant deviation of the Redondo Beach panel’s
opinion, the plaintiffs sought en banc review,116 which was granted on
October 15, 2010.117
6. Commercial Speech Analysis: Attempting to Turn Anti-Solicitation
Ordinances into “Backdoor” Immigration Regulations
Proponents of anti-solicitation ordinances have urged the courts to abandon the analysis of solicitation speech as fully protected traditional speech
under the First Amendment and to instead adopt the more permissive
standard of analysis afforded to speech that is primarily commercial in
nature.118 This is despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
held that the First Amendment protects solicitation, stating that solicitation
speech is protected in traditional public fora due to the fact that it “is
characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech
seeking support for particular causes.”119 The crux of this argument is that
solicitation speech is speech that relates “solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience” or “speech proposing a commercial transaction” within the meaning of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

114. Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 475 F.Supp. 2d at 964.
115. See Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1196–97 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting)
(“The majority inappropriately clings to its subjective and selective interpretation of our opinion in
ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir.1986), as fragile life support for its conclusion.
The ACORN decision, however, is an inapposite as-applied solicitation case that the district court
here and all of our subsequent authority, including our recent en banc decision in Berger v. City of
Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009), have limited to its facts.”).
116. See supra note 17. The Redondo Beach decision is also notable due to the fact that it
“forecloses a challenge to [the anti-solicitation provisions of Arizona’s controversial immigration
law, S.B. 1070] on First Amendment grounds.” See United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp. 2d 980,
1000 n.16 (D. Ariz. 2010).
117. See press release, “MALDEF and NDLON Statements in Response to Court Ruling in
Redondo Beach Day Laborer Case,” http://www.maldef.org/news/releases/maldef_statement_redondo_
beach_day_laborers/.
118. See, e.g., Press Release, Judicial Watch, Judicial Watch Files Amicus Curiae Brief in
Support of Law Banning Illegal Aliens from Seeking Work on City Streets in Redondo Beach (July
11, 2007), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/judicial-watch-files-amicus-curiae-brief-supportlaw-banning-illegal-aliens-seeking-work-city-street.
119. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 628–32 (1980); see also
ACLU II, 466 F.3d at 792 (holding that “[i]t is beyond dispute that solicitation is a form of expression
entitled to the same constitutional protections as traditional speech”).
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Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.120
In advancing this interpretation of commercial speech to include solicitation speech, advocacy organizations such as Judicial Watch—which describes itself as “a conservative, non-partisan educational foundation, promot[ing] transparency, accountability and integrity in government, politics and
the law”121—have argued that the application of traditional measures of
constitutional scrutiny, such as the content-based and content-neutral standards used by the vast majority (if not all) of the state and federal courts that
have heard such challenges, are the result of “an erroneous application of
First Amendment jurisprudence.”122 The fact that the commercial speech
argument has been advanced despite the admission that there is no legal
precedent for analyzing solicitation speech as commercial speech in the
Ninth Circuit—or in any other federal court that has analyzed the constitutionality of such ordinances123—casts a great deal of doubt not only on the merits
of the argument itself, but also on the potential political agenda of those who
seek to promote anti-solicitation ordinances as a “backdoor” regulation of
immigration.
The push for the application of the Central Hudson test to analyze the
constitutionality of solicitation speech is suspect as an attempt to create a
“backdoor” immigration regulation because, when discussing restrictions on
solicitation speech as commercial speech, the argument almost always
inevitably turns to the alleged immigration status of the speakers.124 Judicial
Watch and others who would like to see the courts provide fewer First
Amendment protections to day laborers have betrayed their true motivation
in their briefing by devoting a significant portion of their arguments to the
assumption that day laborers are undocumented, and as such, presumptively
not entitled to solicit employment in public fora.125 Although the merits of
such a position are far from legally sound to begin with,126 the fact that the

120. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980).
121. About Us, JUDICIAL WATCH, http://www.judicialwatch.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 16,
2010).
122. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc. in Support of Appellant, City of Redondo
Beach at 2, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952
(C.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 04-CV-9396-CBM), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2007/
redondo.brief.as.filed.pdf.
123. See id. at 2–3 (“To Judicial Watch’s knowledge, this Court has not yet issued a reported
decision in which it has addressed whether a local ordinance regarding the street-side solicitation of
employment should be analyzed as lesser-protected commercial speech or as more highly protected
expressive or political speech.”).
124. See id. at 11 (“[T]he District Court would have considered whether street-side solicitation of
employment by day laborers is lawful activity, which is doubtful.”) (emphasis added).
125. See id. at 11, n.5 (“The District Court simplistically states that “there does not appear to be
any law that bars undocumented persons from seeking work . . . This assertion ignores, among other
things, that it is unlawful to enter into conspiracies to violate federal law . . . or to aid or abet . . . the
violation of federal immigration laws.”).
126. The type of work sought by day laborers generally consists of temporary, informal work
such as gardening, construction, moving, and handy-work, which is permitted under federal law. See
8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f), (h), (j) (2009).

22

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

argument for a commercial speech standard when analyzing anti-solicitation
ordinances includes speculation of the immigration status of the speakers
reveals the hidden bias inherent in such a position, and exposes antisolicitation laws for what they truly are—“backdoor” regulations of immigration disguised as restrictions on allegedly commercial speech.
II. EL PUEBLO UNIDO: THE ROLE OF DAY LABORER ADVOCACY
ORGANIZATIONS IN DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR CHALLENGING
ANTI-SOLICITATION ORDINANCES
A common misperception about day laborers—individuals who seek
short-term, temporary employment in areas such as construction and landscaping127—is that they are largely transient persons without legal status.128 Due
to the inherent instability of day work, advocacy groups historically had
found it difficult or impossible to organize day laborers or form a coalition of
regular day laborers to advocate for their common interests.129 Although the
presence of day laborers soliciting employment is not a new phenomenon,130
the first serious attempts at organizing day laborers—due to problems such as
wage theft, worksite abuse and safety issues, and issues with police and
community engagement131—occurred in the 1980s, with the establishment of
independent worker centers at regular day laborer hiring sites, also known as
“corners.”132 But it was not until the 1990s, as local governments began to
more aggressively target day laborers through the implementation of antisolicitation ordinances, that a concerted national effort to organize and

127. See DAY LABOR RESEARCH INSTITUTE, http://daylaborinfo.org/default.aspx (last visited Sept.
16, 2010) (defining day laborers as “a worker who stands on a street corner, parking lot, curb,
sidewalk, park etc. to wait for temporary, short term, long term, or fulltime work”).
128. See FAQ, DAY LABOR RESEARCH INSTITUTE, http://daylaborinfo.org/FAQ.aspx (last visited
Sept. 16, 2010) (“It is a misconception to think that all day laborers are ‘illegal aliens.’ We have found
day labor corners where all the day laborers have legal papers (in some San Diego areas), and have
found everywhere that day laborers often have legal papers. It is impossible to look at a group of day
laborers and discern which have papers and which don’t.”).
129. See generally Nik Theodore, When Workers Take the Lead: Leadership Development at the
National Day Labor Organizing Network (NDLON), available at http://wagner.nyu.edu/leadership/
reports/files/WhenWorkersTaketheLead.pdf.
130. See, e.g., See Doe v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 462 F.Supp. 2d 520, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating
that immigrant workers have been soliciting employment in the Village for “half a century or more”).
131. See History of NDLON, NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK, http://www.ndlon.
org/index.php?option⫽com_content&view⫽article&id⫽45&Itemid⫽185 (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
NDLON says its mission is to “improve[]the lives of day laborers in the United States. To this end,
NDLON works to unify and strengthens is [sic] member organizations to be more strategic and
effective in their efforts to develop leadership, mobilize, and organize day laborers in order to protect
and expand their civil, labor and human rights. NDLON fosters safer more humane environments for
day laborer, both men and women, to earn a living, contribute to society, and integrate into the
community.” Our Mission and Vision, NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK, http://
www.ndlon.org/index.php?option⫽com_content&view⫽article&id⫽60&Itemid⫽182 (last visited
Sept. 16, 2010). Additionally, NDLON describes its vision as “aspir[ing] to live in a world of diverse
communities where day laborers live with full rights and responsibilities in an environment of mutual
respect, peace, harmony and justice.” Id.
132. History of NDLON, supra note 131.
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advocate on behalf of day laborers began to emerge.133
A. Early Day Labor Organizing and Advocacy Strategies
In response to the attempted crackdown by local governments on day
laborers’ efforts to solicit employment in public fora, advocates developed a
two-prong strategy for ensuring that day laborers would be able to continue
to look for work at both organized centers and more informal corners.134 In
addition to a formal organizing strategy, which included identifying leaders
among day laborers and training them to advocate for their communities and
develop their advocacy and organizing skills,135 a major focus of the united
day labor communities was to work with legal advocacy organizations to
develop a litigation strategy to challenge the constitutionality of antisolicitation ordinances.136 It was this focus on strategic litigation that
inspired leaders in the day labor movement to attempt to create a more
centralized effort to advocate for day laborers and, ultimately, to form the
National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON).137
B. National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON)
In 2001, a group called the National Day Labor Organizing Network
(NDLON) was founded in California with the express purpose of “improving
the lives of day laborers in the United States.”138 From its humble beginnings
of twelve community-based organizations and worker centers,139 NDLON
grew to be a major player and national advocate, not only for day laborers,
but also for immigrants and low-wage workers across the country, to seek to
work together to advocate for justice, equality, and systemic change in
immigration law and policy. NDLON initially described its strategic priorities as: 1) protecting labor and civil rights, 2) creating day labor worker
centers, 3) enhancing the education and organizing of day laborers, and 4)
calling for a legalization program to regularize the status of undocumented
immigrants.140 In 2007, after a series of national conventions and the election
of a Board of Directors in 2004,141 NDLON revised its goals and adopted a

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (“[This] approach was built upon an organizing strategy that sought to increase the
capacity of day laborer leaders to come together as an organized community capable of effectively
representing themselves to government officials, law enforcement authorities, and other local
stakeholders.”).
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id (noting that NDLON now has 36 member organizations nationwide). Its member groups
are often plaintiffs in litigations challenging anti-solicitation and anti-immigrant ordinances. See
supra note 17.
140. Id.
141. Id. (stating that NDLON held its first National Conference in 2002, and has held an annual
conference every year since 2004).
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five-year strategic plan that includes formal relationships with the prominent
organized labor groups AFL-CIO and Change to Win, as well as a continued
commitment to engage day laborers in “a civil and social right [sic]
movement to recognize their contributions and rights in the US.”142 Furthermore, in addition to its involvement in challenging anti-solicitation ordinances targeted at day laborers in California and Arizona,143 NDLON has
also been instrumental in challenging anti-solicitation laws in other parts of
the country, particularly New York state, through a partnership with the
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, also known as LatinoJustice/PRLDEF.144
Recently, NDLON became involved in the high-profile litigation challenging the State of Arizona’s regulation of immigration, S.B. 1070, which
contains a provision prohibiting the solicitation of labor in public fora.145
NDLON’s involvement with the challenge to the anti-solicitation provision
of S.B. 1070 is consistent with NDLON’s history and mission of advocating
for the rights of day laborers, and it is also the latest in a string of actions
taken by NDLON to bring attention to the general anti-immigrant sentiment
rising in Arizona over the past decade.146 NDLON’s new concentration on
anti-immigrant sentiment is broadly consistent with the fourth prong of
142. Id. (noting that, in addition to establishing formal relationships with organized labor, the
5-year strategic plan adopted at the 2007 National Conference affirmed the goals identified at
previous conferences as well as implementing legislative advocacy and additional leadership training
skills for member organizations).
143. See supra Part I.A.3.
144. See, e.g., Doe v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 462 F.Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Complaint at 1,
Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay (E.D.N.Y. filed May 28,
2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010-5-18-OysterBay-Complaint_0.pdf; see also
Press Release, LatinoJustice, NY Day Labor Orgs. Challenge Anti-Immigrant Ordinance (May 18,
2010), available at http://latinojustice.org/briefing_room/press_releases/Orgs_challenge_oyster_
bay_ordinance/.
145. S.B. 49-170, 2d Sess., § 5 (Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/
bills/sb1070s.pdf (reading in pertinent part, “Title 13, chapter 29, Arizona Revised Statutes, is
amended by adding sections 13-2928 and 13-2929, to read: 13-2928. Unlawful stopping to hire and
pick up passengers for work; unlawful application, solicitation or employment; classification;
definitions A. IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR AN OCCUPANT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS
STOPPED ON A STREET, ROADWAY OR HIGHWAY TO ATTEMPT TO HIRE OR HIRE AND
PICK UP PASSENGERS FOR WORK AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION IF THE MOTOR VEHICLE
BLOCKS OR IMPEDES THE NORMAL MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC. B. IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A
PERSON TO ENTER A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS STOPPED ON A STREET, ROADWAY OR
HIGHWAY IN ORDER TO BE HIRED BY AN OCCUPANT OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE AND TO
BE TRANSPORTED TO WORK AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION IF THE MOTOR VEHICLE
BLOCKS OR IMPEDES THE NORMAL MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC. C. IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A
PERSON WHO IS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND WHO IS AN
UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN TO KNOWINGLY APPLY FOR WORK, SOLICIT WORK IN A PUBLIC
PLACE OR PERFORM WORK AS AN EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR IN
THIS STATE. D. A VIOLATION OF THIS SECTION IS A CLASS 1 MISDEMEANOR.”). NDLON
is part of a coalition of civil rights groups challenging S.B. 1070 in Friendly House v. Whiting, one of
seven lawsuits currently filed challenging the constitutionality of the Arizona law. See infra Part
IV.B.2. The United States Department of Justice, on behalf of itself and other federal agencies,
including the Department of Homeland Security, has also challenged the anti-solicitation portion of
S.B. 1070 as preempted by federal law. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (D.
Ariz. 2010).
146. See supra Part I.A.2-3 and note 17.

2010]

HIGH COST OF FREE SPEECH

25

NDLON’s renewed mission and vision,147 and while the devotion of a
significant portion of NDLON’s limited resources to the high-profile battleground of Arizona148 may cause some to question whether NDLON should
further broaden the scope of its advocacy from focusing solely or primarily
on day labor issues, the expansion of NDLON’s focus in high-profile
advocacy issues means a great deal of potential growth for both NDLON and
the day labor movement going forward.
C. Tonatierra, Centro Jornalero Macehualli and the Pruitt’s Protests
One of the most successful day laborer advocacy groups is located in the
heart of the modern battleground on immigration—Phoenix, Arizona. Centro
Jornalero Macehualli, a project of the Tonatierra Community Development
Institute, was started in early 2003 as a day laborer center completely
managed by day laborers themselves.149 In addition to providing a safe and
organized space for day laborers to solicit employment, Centro Macehualli
also provides English as a Second Language (ESL) classes, computer classes,
and other educational classes to members of the day laborer and immigrant
communities in Phoenix and central Arizona.150 Additionally, there is currently a capital campaign underway to establish a community campus for
Centro Macehualli, which once completed will include medical service
providers and clinics, a legal services center, a workforce development and
training center, a public library, tax preparation services, and a Youth and
Senior Citizen Center.151
Salvador Reza, the co-founder of Centro Macehualli, garnered national
media attention in 2007 when Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio began
arresting day laborers for soliciting work near Pruitt’s, a furniture store in

147. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
148. NDLON has organized an “Arizona Campaign” which, among other activities, has focused
on organizing protests against Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio and using Arizona as a staging
ground for pushing the need for comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level. See Urgent
Appeal for Action in Arizona, NATIONAL DAY LABOR ORGANIZING NETWORK, http://www.ndlon.org/
index.php?view⫽article&id⫽181%3Aurgent-appeal-for-action-in-arizona&option⫽com_content
&Itemid⫽146 (last visited Sept. 16, 2010) (“The abuse of immigrants in Maricopa County, Arizona
has become nothing less than a domestic human rights crisis that demands a response from us all. A
coordinated national intervention effort will not only alleviate local suffering by bringing much
needed attention, resources, and support to our brothers and sisters in Arizona, it will also generate
consensus to help scaffold efforts to achieve broader federal immigration reform goals. We may not
be able to pass large-scale, immigration reform legislation in Washington [sic] DC right away, but we
can—and we must—put a stop to the dehumanization of immigrants. We can find unity in our
condemnation of the worst treatment of immigrants, and we can make clear that we will not allow our
country to become like Arizona.”).
149. See Centro Jornalero Macehualli, CENTRO MACEHUALLI, http://centromacehualli.org/
Centro_Macehualli.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2010) (“The Macehuallis . . . have created one of the
few self-managed center [sic] in the nation. The workers themselves have created the rules and
regulations, take responsibilities of translation, facilitation between workers and employers, and
maintain a register to process workers in an orderly manner.”).
150. See Home Page, CENTRO MACEHUALLI, http://centromacehualli.org/Home_Page.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2010).
151. See id.
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Phoenix.152 The area surrounding Pruitt’s became a flashpoint for day laborer
and immigrant advocates when Sheriff Arpaio dispatched a number of
off-duty MCSO deputies to Pruitt’s and arrested a number of day laborers
soliciting work near Pruitt’s property, presumably on the assumption that
they were undocumented.153 Although the controversy surrounding the
Pruitt’s protests has abated, Mr. Reza continues to be a high-profile activist
for day laborer and immigrants’ rights issues, most recently in conjunction
with Arizona’s recent attempt to pass its own state-level immigration law.154
The involvement of Mr. Reza and Centro Macehualli in day labor advocacy
in Arizona over the past several years, in conjunction with their work with
NDLON and another Arizona immigrants’ rights group, Puente,155 has had a
positive impact on the growth of the day labor rights movement not just in the
Southwest, but across the entire country.
III.

VICTORY WITHOUT REMEDY: PROBLEMS NOT ADDRESSED THROUGH FIRST
AMENDMENT LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF DAY LABORERS

As Part I demonstrates, there has been a wealth of litigation challenging
anti-solicitation ordinances on behalf of day laborers, particularly in the last
decade.156 In fact, until the Ninth Circuit’s decision reversing the district
court in the Redondo Beach case, the litigation strategy of challenging local
laws that were intended to prevent day laborers from soliciting work in
public fora as unconstitutional regulations of protected First Amendment
activity had been extremely successful, resulting in temporary and permanent
injunctions prohibiting enforcement of the ordinances, as well as settlements
repealing the laws.157 However, despite these successes in the courtroom
vindicating their First Amendment right to solicit employment, day laborers
continue to be the object of public scorn and often find themselves in the

152. See, e.g., Andrew Stelzer, The Selma of Immigration Rights, IN THESE TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008,
available at http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3973/ (discussing the targeting of day laborers near
Pruitt’s furniture store as part of Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s “nativist agenda”).
153. See Eduardo Barraza, Joe Arpaio and Demonstrators Stir Up Immigration Debate at a Rally
in East Phoenix, BARRIOZONA, http://www.barriozona.com/rally_pruitts_furniture.html (“Saturday’s
rally was in response to several arrests of day laborers made by Arpaio’s department in previous
weeks, as well as to voice disapproval for the employment of off-duty sheriff deputies providing a
sort of private police-surveillance of Pruitt’s premises against men who they see wandering around
seeking work, and presumably undocumented.”).
154. See, e.g., Stephen Lemons, Joe Arpaio’s Goons Grab Salvador Reza Off the Street and
Arrest Him, Again, PHX. NEW TIMES, July 30, 2010, available at http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/
bastard/2010/07/joe_arpaios_goons_grab_salvado.php (describing the detention and arrest of Salvador Reza at a protest by officials from Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office near the Lower Buckeye Jail
in Phoenix, Arizona).
155. Puente describes itself as a human rights movement “[t]hat works to resurrect our humanity
by teaching and learning to eradicate intolerance when it presents itself at individual, economic,
political, social and religious settings affecting our daily existence.” See About Us, PUENTE,
http://www.puenteaz.org/ABOUT_US_MHC2.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2010). Salvador Reza is
also affiliated with Puente. Lemons, supra note 154.
156. See supra Part I.
157. See supra notes 25, 31, 87–88 and accompanying text.
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crosshairs of contentious debates surrounding immigration law and policy.158
This apparent paradox begs the question—why, despite repeated and forceful
approval by the federal courts of their right to solicit work in public fora, has
First Amendment litigation on behalf of day laborers been a practical failure?
The following section of this Article will demonstrate how First Amendment
challenges to anti-solicitation ordinances are pyrrhic victories because they
do not address the root causes of the inherent vulnerability of day work, and
that the right of day laborers to speak freely remains chilled by discrimination, racial profiling, selective enforcement, and anti-immigrant sentiment in
the general public.
A. Discrimination and Racial Profiling Against Day Laborers
Perhaps the biggest reason First Amendment litigation seeking to enjoin
the enforcement of anti-solicitation ordinances has been practically ineffective is because, even when day laborers are able to disseminate their message
in public fora and seek employment without fear of arrest by law enforcement because of the content of their speech, the high-profile nature of day
laborers continues to draw the attention of law enforcement and antiimmigrant groups. Although not all—or even a majority—of day laborers are
without legal immigration status,159 their presence in public places and the
fact that many day laborers are adult Latino men makes them easy targets for
overzealous state and local law enforcement, immigration authorities, and
private citizens who wish to make their opposition to “illegal aliens” publicly
known.160
1. State and Local Law Enforcement of Immigration Law
Day laborers who congregate in front of public places, such as 7-Eleven,
Home Depot, or other locales where persons can hire day workers for
short-term employment, have long been targets for state and local law
enforcement officials who wish to cite day laborers for civil infractions such
as loitering and trespass in order to get the laborers to disperse.161 Other
jurisdictions, such as the City of Redondo Beach, have attempted to enforce
their anti-solicitation ordinances by organizing “stings” in which police
officers posed as employers in order to cite and/or arrest day laborers for
soliciting employment.162 In choosing to target day laborers in this manner—
while seldom, if ever, targeting other groups that gather in a similar manner

158. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
159. See FAQ, supra note 128.
160. See infra Part III.
161. See DAY LABOR RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 127.
162. See Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F.Supp.2d 952,
955 (C.D. Cal 2006).
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for citation, arrest, or dispersal163—state and local law enforcement officials
have opened themselves up to charges of selective enforcement based on the
race, ethnicity, and perceived immigration status of day laborers as a
whole.164
However, while enforcement of low-level state and local misdemeanors no
doubt has a chilling effect on the willingness and ability of day laborers to
solicit employment in public fora, most state and local law enforcement
officials do not attempt to enforce perceived violations of civil or criminal
immigration law against day laborers and look instead to the federal government to conduct enforcement of federal immigration law.165

2. Selective Enforcement by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Because state and local law enforcement officials do not generally have the
power to enforce immigration law,166 the biggest threat to undocumented day
laborers currently seeking employment in public fora is a potential raid by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Although ICE agents may
occasionally run afoul of the law when attempting to question and detain
persons for potential immigration law violations in public places,167 in
general, federal immigration officials may make inquires of day laborers—or

163. See, e.g., Answering Brief of Appellees at 45, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v.
City of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 06-55750), 2007 WL 243411 2434115
(C.A.9) (“The Ordinance, as written, restricts a substantially overbroad range of speech with no
measurable impact on traffic. By its terms, the Ordinance prohibits a pedestrian from hailing a taxi
(even a taxi parked by the curb), a resident at a bus stop waving down a bus driver, or a valet parking
attendant from gesturing to patrons where to pull over their cars. Moreover, the Ordinance prohibits
teenagers on the sidewalk from holding ‘Car Wash’ signs, children from selling lemonade or Girl
Scout cookies on the sidewalk, or a motorist from stopping on a residential street to ask whether a
neighbor would be interested in performing yard work or babysitting.”).
164. See, e.g., Editorial, Day Laborers’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2006, available at http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res⫽9C00E0DC133EF937A15752C1A9609C8B63 (“You cannot abuse people through selective enforcement of the law. You cannot single people out for special
punishment without cause. You cannot instruct the police to harass people for being Latino and poor.
Cities and towns across the country have overlooked these basics in their eagerness to punish those
they presume to have violated federal immigration laws. But thankfully for all of us, the Constitution
still has the final say.”).
165. The reason most state and local law enforcement officials do not attempt to cite or arrest day
laborers for immigration violations is due to the fact that the federal government, with some
exceptions, retains exclusive authority to enforce both civil and criminal violations of immigration
law. See, e.g., MONICA GUIZAR, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, FACTS ABOUT FEDERAL
PREEMPTION 1 (2007), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/federalpreemption
facts_2007-06-28.pdf. The only exception is when a state or local law enforcement jurisdiction has
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g) (2006), permitting them to enforce some civil provisions of immigration law in certain
circumstances. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, THE ICE 287(G) PROGRAM: A
L AW E NFORCEMENT P ARTNERSHIP (2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/
section287_g.htm.
166. GUIZAR, supra note 165, at 1.
167. See discussion infra pp.41–42.
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anyone else in a public forum—about their immigration status.168 Although
day laborers are generally not under any obligation to answer questions about
their legal status or to produce proof of their legal status if they are not under
arrest and are otherwise free to leave,169 the fact remains that the simple
presence of immigration enforcement officials in or around sites where day
laborers congregate constitutes an implicit—if not explicit—threat to their
right to solicit employment and thus has a chilling effect on their willingness
to do so.
One of the most notorious examples of overzealous and selective enforcement of federal immigration law by ICE against day laborers is the incident
that has come to be known as the case of the “Danbury 11” in Danbury,
Connecticut, in September 2006.170 On September 19, 2006, in a sting that
was organized in conjunction with the Danbury police department, ICE
officers detained day laborers who believed they were being offered work by
local law enforcement officers posing as contractors.171 The detained workers, who were put into deportation proceedings following the sting by law
enforcement, were represented by the Workers’ and Immigrants’ Rights
Advocacy Clinic at Yale Law School in both their immigration cases and in a
federal civil rights lawsuit.172 Because the Danbury police department did
have a 287(g) agreement with ICE, and because the only charge leveled at the
day laborers was illegal entry into the United States,173 the civil rights action
on behalf of the day laborers alleges that the Danbury police were not
authorized to arrest them, that ICE violated their own policies in detaining
the workers, and that they were racially profiled for arrest and detention by

168. See, e.g., Know Your Rights: What to Do if You’re Stopped by Police, Immigration Agents or
the FBI, ACLU (June 30, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/drug-law-reform-immigrants-rights-racial-justice/
know-your-rights-what-do-if-you.
169. Like anyone else, day laborers may not generally be questioned by law enforcement officials
without individualized reasonable suspicion that they are involved in criminal activity. Id. However,
whether or not reasonable suspicion exists will depend on a variety of factors, including state law
regarding when an individual must produce identification, and the proximity of the individual in
question to an international border. Id. (“You have the right to remain silent and do not have to discuss
your immigration or citizenship status with police, immigration agents or any other officials. You do
not have to answer questions about where you were born, whether you are a U.S. citizen, or how you
entered the country. (Separate rules apply at international borders and airports, and for individuals on
certain nonimmigrant visas, including tourists and business travelers.)”).
170. See generally The Truth About the Danbury 11, SOCIALIST PARTY NYC available at
http://www.spnyc.org/TruthAboutDanbury11.pdf (describing briefly the arrest of the “Danbury 11”
and the subsequent fallout).
171. See Danbury 11 case returns to courtroom on Monday, WESTPORT NEWS, Feb. 1, 2008,
available at http://www.westport-news.com/news/article/Danbury-11-case-returns-to-courtroom-onMonday-109665.php.
172. See id.; see also Mary E. O’Leary, Danbury Mayor Defends Cops in Profiling Case, NEW
HAVEN REG., July 18, 2010, available at http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2010/07/18/news/
doc4c427b5af0092255026256.txt (discussing the ongoing civil rights lawsuit brought by the day
laborers against ICE and the Danbury police).
173. See O’Leary, supra note 172. Some of the Danbury police officers testified in depositions
that the day laborers were detained for the alleged offense of “illegal use of the highway by a
pedestrian.” Id. However, none of the detained workers were ever charged with such an offense, and
the very existence of such an infraction is in dispute. Id.
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law enforcement.174 Although several of the “Danbury 11” were deported
following their arrest and detention,175 as of October 2010, the federal civil
rights action remains ongoing.176
3. Anti-Immigrant Groups
Perhaps in response to frustration with the federal government’s perceived
inability or unwillingness to enforce immigration law,177 in recent years,
anti-immigrant groups such as Save Our State178 and the Minuteman Project179
have encouraged private citizens to take it upon themselves to confront
persons perceived to be undocumented immigrants—including day laborers
soliciting work in public fora.180 Joe Turner, the founder of Save Our State
and self-described “proud nationalist,”181 has encouraged the harassment of
day laborers because it both intimidates the workers and discourages contractors from hiring them.182 Although there is only anecdotal evidence demonstrating that such tactics are successful in deterring day laborers from
soliciting work,183 the fact that day laborers remain such high-profile targets

174. See WESTPORT NEWS, supra note 171.
175. Id. (noting that two of the original eleven day laborers detained in the Danbury sting had
been removed).
176. See O’LEARY, supra note 172.
177. See e.g., S.B. 49-170, 2d Sess., § 1 (Ariz. 2010) (providing in pertinent part that “The
legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the cooperative enforcement of federal
immigration laws throughout all of Arizona. The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to
make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in
Arizona. The provisions of this act are intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful
entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United
States”), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf.
178. See SAVE OUR STATE, http://www.saveourstate.info/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2010). “Save Our
State” is an activist organization in California with a long history of anti-immigrant sentiment, and is
most prominent for its involvement in the Proposition 187 battle in California in the mid-1990s. See,
e.g., Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Found Unconstitutional by Judge, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1997,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/1997/nov/15/news/mn-54053 (discussing Save Our State’s
role in promoting the passage of Proposition 187 and intention to appeal court ruling striking it
down). Save Our State reorganized in 2009, and now describes itself as “new and improved,” and
describes its mission in part as “[t]o educate California’s native born, legal US citizens, and
naturalized US citizens, about the effects that illegal immigration and increased legal immigration
may have on their quality of life; economy; ability to control their government and its’ [sic]
expenditures; and their rights and options as an affected class of persons.” See Save Our State Articles
of Incorporation (Sept. 29, 2009) available at http://publicdocumentdistributors.com/forums/
attachment.php?s⫽6afc91162163bdfad1e55e8c5fdffecc&attachmentid⫽316&d⫽1254355019.
179. See MINUTEMAN PROJECT, http://www.minutemanproject.com/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
The Minuteman Project describes itself as having been formed by its founder, Jim Gilchrist, in 2004
“after years of frustrated efforts trying to get a neglectful U.S. government to simply enforce existing
immigration laws.” See About Us, M INUTEMEN P ROJECT , http://www.minutemanproject.com/
organization/about_us.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
180. See, e.g., Ezra, Vigilante: Deport Them All, RIGHT WING WATCH (July 10, 2008 3:55 PM),
http://www.rightwingwatch.org/category/groups/save-our-state (detailing how anti-immigrant activists commonly target day laborers and hiring sites for harassment, including taking video of day
laborers and posting it on the Internet).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Connie Cone Sexton, Day-Labor Protests Rile Group, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 11,
2008, available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0111protest0111.html.
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for anti-immigrant groups and subject to harassment reinforces the vulnerability of persons who solicit day work and the racism inherent in antisolicitation ordinances that cannot fundamentally be addressed by First
Amendment litigation.
IV:

ANTI-SOLICITATION ORDINANCES AND THE TARGETING OF DAY LABORERS
AS “BACKDOOR” LOCAL IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS

Although the most common justification given by states, cities, and towns
that have enacted anti-solicitation ordinances is a desire to regulate a
traditional public interest—such as traffic flow and safety184—this Article
argues that, at their core, anti-solicitation ordinances passed by jurisdictions
in response to the presence of day laborers and targeted enforcement against
day laborers for minor civil violations such as loitering and trespass are
actually “backdoor” local regulations of immigration. Because direct attempts to regulate immigration by states and cities have led to costly (and
often unsuccessful) litigation,185 local governments have tried to find other
ways to indirectly regulate immigration and put pressure on persons and
groups who may be undocumented without actually making reference to
immigration status. The desire by local governments to target persons who
are perceived to be undocumented immigrants are, in fact, immigration
regulations disguised as some other type of permissible law. I argue that in
many cases, when cities and towns approve anti-solicitation ordinances
and/or local law enforcement officials target day laborers for minor infractions, the actual motivation of the local government is to reduce or completely eliminate day laborers from its jurisdiction. Thus, because day
laborers are perceived by the general public to be “illegal aliens,” these types
of anti-solicitation ordinances and law enforcement efforts targeting day
laborers are indirect attempts to regulate immigration at the local level—they
are “backdoor” regulations of immigration.
Although most attempts by cities and towns to enact anti-solicitation
ordinances or step up civil enforcement against day laborers have at least
some plausible nexus to their purported public safety justifications, the
reasons given by some local governments are thinly-veiled attempts to enact
a “backdoor” immigration regulation against undocumented persons. For
example, the rationale put forth by the city of Baldwin Park, California for its
anti-solicitation ordinance was that the city needed to make the sidewalks
safer for persons in wheelchairs to move about in an unobstructed manner.186
However, a subsequent interview with the mayor of Baldwin Park, Manuel
Lozano, revealed that the city of Baldwin Park’s anti-solicitation ordinance

184. See, e.g., Part I.
185. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F.Supp. 2d 477, 521 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
186. See BALDWIN PARK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 97.136-137 (repealed), available at http://
baldwinpark.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id⫽10&clip_id⫽750&meta_id⫽77080.

32

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

was part of the city council’s attempt to stem the perception that Baldwin
Park is full of “amigo stores,” such as check-cashing businesses and Latino
supermarkets, that allegedly attract undocumented immigrants.187 Although
Baldwin Park’s anti-solicitation ordinance was quickly enjoined from enforcement, and the city council eventually worked with day laborers to create a
center for them to solicit work in the city of Baldwin Park,188 Baldwin Park’s
attempt to prohibit day laborers from soliciting employment in traditional
public fora demonstrates the type of animus often directed toward day
laborers by local governments that feel threatened by an actual or perceived
increase in the population of undocumented immigrants in their cities and
towns.
Some local governments, however, do not even attempt to justify their
“backdoor” immigration regulations as necessitated by a municipal interest
such as traffic flow and safety. The following cases demonstrate instances in
which state and local governments have attempted to use pretextual means
for targeting day laborers in an effort to reduce their alleged problem with
“illegal immigration” and the problems that have resulted from such “backdoor” regulations of immigration, such as racial profiling of Latinos.
A. Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck
The village of Mamaroneck, New York, is a city that has had a long history
of immigrant workers soliciting employment in the village area known as
Columbus Park.189 Prior to the 1990s, most of the immigrants soliciting
employment in Columbus Park were white.190 However, in recent years, the
majority of persons soliciting employment in Columbus Park have been
Latino.191 Despite an increase in the number of day laborers soliciting work
in the early 2000s—from approximately twenty to thirty persons to sixty to
eighty persons per day—no additional police presence was requested or
required at the day labor solicitation location through 2004.192
Despite no reported problems with the day laborers soliciting employment
at the Columbus Park location, in August 2004, village officials decided that
day laborers were no longer permitted to congregate in that location.193 The
day labor solicitation site was moved to another location, and shortly
187. See Hector Becerra, Latino, Yes, but With New Tastes L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2008, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/28/local/me-amigostores28 (quoting Mayor Manuel Lozano
as saying “‘We want what Middle America has as well . . . We like to go to nice places like Claim
Jumpers, Chili’s and Applebee’s . . . . We don’t want the fly-by-night business, the “amigo store,”
which they use to attract Latinos like myself.’”).
188. See Tania Chatila, Day Laborer Center Mulled, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB., Apr. 27, 2008,
available at LEXIS.
189. See Doe v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that
immigrant workers have been soliciting employment in the village for a “half a century or more”).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 525–26.
193. Id. at 526.
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thereafter, the mayor of the village began publicly disparaging the presence
of the day laborers and questioning their residency in the village.194 At the
same time, law enforcement officials began to aggressively ticket commercial vehicles parked near the day labor solicitation site in order to deter them
from picking up day laborers and offering them employment.195 Village
police also increased their presence and visibility in the area of the day labor
solicitation site, which intimidated day laborers from frequenting the area in
search of employment and reduced the daily number of persons seeking work
to approximately thirty to forty per day.196
Once the number of day laborers frequenting the solicitation site had
decreased significantly, the mayor declared that the village “no longer ha[d] a
[day laborer problem],” and later publicly characterized the situation with
day laborers in the village as “an out of control problem . . . where we had a
vast number of laborers coming to our village seeking employment.”197 The
court found that the statements made by the mayor concerning the number of
day laborers and their alleged residency had no basis in fact198 and that his
statements were “designed to justify the law enforcement campaign that
ensued” against day laborers soliciting work in the village for the next
seventeen months.199 The justifications offered by the village for the increased crackdown on day laborers were “quality of life issues” and the
alleged link between the solicitation of employment by day laborers and
“prostitution, drug-dealing, public intoxication, urination and defecation . . . and
criminal activity.”200 However, the mayor had previously conceded that he
did not receive any complaints from residents or police about the conduct of
day laborers at the hiring site.201
Nonetheless, the Village Board of Trustees resolved that the day laborer
hiring would be closed by February 1, 2006 “until further notice.”202
Following increased law enforcement activity against day laborers that was
designed to prevent them from soliciting work anywhere in the village,203
eight individual day laborers and the National Day Labor Organizing
Network (NDLON) filed a lawsuit against the village, asserting equal
protection violations and racial profiling.204 The choice to pursue a legal

194. Id. at 526–27.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 527–28.
197. Id. at 528.
198. Id. at 527.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 530.
201. Id. at 531.
202. Id. at 532.
203. Id. at 534 (summarizing increased threats of arrests and citations of day laborers in the
village following the closing of the day labor hiring site).
204. Id. at 541–44 (finding that NDLON did not have standing to pursue these claims, but the
eight individual plaintiffs (all proceeding as “Does”) did have standing to seek redress against the
village).
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theory of redress other than asserting a First Amendment violation of the day
laborers’ right to solicit work was a bold one, and it paid off. In her analysis
of the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, United State District Judge Colleen
McMahon of the Southern District of New York found that the Village
“engaged in a campaign designed to drive out the Latino day laborers who
gather on the streets of Mamaroneck to seek work. The fact that the day
laborers were Latinos and not whites was, at least in part, a motivating factor
in defendants’ actions.”205 Although Judge McMahon stopped short of
agreeing with the plaintiffs that Village law enforcement officials engaged in
selective prosecution of day laborers,206 she did find that the village engaged
in a “campaign of harassment and intimidation against . . . Latino day laborers in Mamaroneck—effectuated through the discriminatory application of a
neutral law”207 and stated that the plaintiffs “met their burden of going
forward on the issue of intentional racism.”208 She also found that “Plaintiffs
have more than met their burden of going forward with evidence that there
was a campaign of targeted harassment, and that it was, at least in part, based
on the race or ethnicity of the day laborers.”209
Despite Judge McMahon’s strongly-worded decision affirming the racial
and ethnic motivation of the targeted law enforcement of day laborers in
Mamaroneck, to date, there have been no other similar reported decisions
attacking the harassment and criminalization of day laborers.210 This is
perhaps because the Mamaroneck lawsuit involved a pattern-and-practice
claim against law enforcement officials for targeting day laborers, while
other lawsuits have challenged local ordinances that ostensibly focused on
speech and conduct rather than the day laborers themselves.211 Nonetheless,
the Village of Mamaroneck case is notable because it exemplifies the often
ugly and xenophobic motivations underlying facially neutral laws, and how
the targeting of day laborers through “backdoor” immigration regulations
can take many forms.
B. Arizona S.B. 1070: Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act
In April 2010, Arizona Governor Janice K. Brewer signed into law S.B.
1070, also known as the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighbor-

205. Id. at 543.
206. Id. at 544.
207. Id. at 546.
208. Id. at 549.
209. Id. at 550.
210. The case at bar was settled in June 2007, with the Village agreeing to amend its law
enforcement policies regarding day laborers and paying more than $500,000 in fees to the Plaintiffs.
See Hispanic day laborers, New York village reach tentative agreement over discrimination lawsuit,
N. COUNTY TIMES, June 12, 2010, available at http://www.nctimes.com/news/national/article_d47bcf9f3a1e-5c9a-b3e5-9bb296c98679.html.
211. See supra Part I.
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hoods Act.212 Referred to as one of the toughest immigration laws in the
country,213 S.B. 1070 is a statewide regulation of immigration that would
give local law enforcement throughout Arizona the ability—indeed, the
responsibility—to detain persons whom they have “reasonable suspicion” to
believe may be in the country without documents.214 The law also requires all
persons to carry with them documents regarding their immigration status,
which apparently includes United States citizens.215 This type of “papers
please” regulation has caused critics of S.B. 1070 to compare it to laws
passed in Germany’s Third Reich216 and has given rise to accusations that the
law will lead to racial profiling of Latinos and other persons of color that law
enforcement officials may believe “look” undocumented.217
Although S.B. 1070 has generated a great deal of media attention,218 one
of the provisions that has not received either much praise or criticism is
Section 5 of S.B. 1070, which would add A.R.S. § 13-2928 (C), making it
“unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in the United States and
who is an unauthorized alien” to “solicit work in a public place.”219 Unlike
previous attempts to regulate solicitation of employment by day laborers,
Section 5 of S.B. 1070 is not a local ordinance—it is a statewide prohibition

212. S.B. 49-170, 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/
sb1070s.pdf..
213. See, e.g. Randal C. Archibald, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html?_r⫽1&hp
(“[P]roponents and critics alike said [the Arizona law] was the broadest and strictest immigration
measure in generations.”).
214. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010).
215. Id. § 13-1509. Different interpretations of S.B. 1070 have reached different conclusions
regarding who must carry proof of citizenship with them under the Arizona law. Proponents of the law
claim that the Arizona law merely mirrors federal immigration law, which requires lawfully present
aliens to carry proof of their legal status with them at all times and to present such documents to
immigration authorities on demand. Opponents, however, point out that there is no law that requires
U.S. citizens to carry proof of citizenship with them or to present their citizenship documents to law
enforcement, and argue that the document provisions of S.B. 1070 will be unevenly and unfairly
enforced against U.S. citizens of color. See, e.g., John Merline, Opinion Roundup: Ariz. Immigration
Lawsuit’s Uncertain Future, AOL NEWS, July 7, 2010, available at http://www.aolnews.com/article/
opinion-roundup-the-arizona-immigration-lawsuits-uncertain-fut/19545017 (quoting different experts’ opinions about the merits of S.B. 1070 and the likelihood of success of the government’s legal
challenge to the law).
216. See, e.g., Stephen Lemons, Cardinal Roger Mahoney Compares SB 1070 to “German Nazi
and Russian Communist Techniques,” PHX. NEW TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, available at http://
blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/bastard/2010/04/cardinal_roger_mahony_compares.php.
217. See, e.g., John Blackstone, Will Arizona’s Law Lead to Racial Profiling? Law Enforcement
See Legislation as a Tool for Fighting Crime; Opponents Worry Measure Will Perpetuate Racism,
CBS NEWS, Apr. 26, 2010, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/26/eveningnews/
main6434594.shtml (expressing concerns that United States citizens of Hispanic descent will be
targeted for enforcement under the Arizona law “because [they are] brown”).
218. See, e.g., Arizona Law Sets off Nation-Wide Firestorm, THE DAILY CALLER, Apr. 28, 2010,
available at http://dailycaller.com/2010/04/28/arizona-law-sets-off-nation-wide-firestorm/ (noting
the unprecedented national focus on Arizona’s immigration law and policy following the passage of
S.B. 1070).
219. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2928(C) (2010).
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on solicitation of employment by “unauthorized alien[s].”220 Prior to the
passage of S.B. 1070, the Arizona legislature had previously approved
statewide bans on solicitation of employment in public fora, only to have
those bills vetoed by former Arizona Governor (now Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security) Janet Napolitano.221 Although several
provisions of S.B. 1070 have been enjoined, including A.R.S. § 132928(C),222 day laborers in Arizona face the possibility that they ultimately
may not be able to seek work anywhere in the state, in contradiction to Ninth
Circuit precedent in both California and Arizona affirming their First Amendment right to solicit employment in public.223

1. United States v. Arizona
Of the seven lawsuits filed challenging S.B. 1070 generally, two of the
lawsuits specifically challenge Section 5.224 In a lawsuit filed by the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) on behalf of itself, the United States
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of State,225
the Obama Administration challenged Arizona’s immigration law on the
ground that several of its provisions, including Section 5 in its entirety, are

220. Id. § 13-2928(G)(2) (stating that “‘Unauthorized alien’ means an alien who does not have
the legal right or authorization under federal law to work in the United States as described in 8
[U.S.C. §] 1324a(h)(3)”). However, the inability to have employment authorization under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) does not make one an “unauthorized alien” under federal
law (such as aliens lawfully present on F-2 visa as derivative beneficiaries of F-1 student visa
holders), nor does the possession of a work authorization document confer lawful status upon an alien
(such as those aliens whose applications for adjustment of status are in process or aliens who have
been granted withholding of removal). See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101,
1324a(h)(3) (2006).
221. See, e.g., Day Labor Bill Vetoed, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, May 2, 2007, available at
http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2007/05/02/day-labor-bill-vetoed/.
222. Prior to its scheduled enactment on July 29, 2010, seven lawsuits were filed in United States
District Court in Arizona seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent S.B. 1070 from being enforced
while the courts determine the constitutionality of the Act and its various provisions. District Judge
Susan R. Bolton, who is presiding over six of the seven cases filed, heard oral argument from the
various parties regarding their request to enjoin the law on July 15 and July 22, 2010. See Alia Beard
Rau and Kevin Kiley, Major SB 1070 Challenges Being Heard Today, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 22, 2010,
available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/07/11/20100711arizona-immigration-lawjustic-department.html. The day before the law was set to go into effect, on July 28, 2010, Judge
Bolton preliminarily enjoined several provisions of S.B. 1070, including A.R.S. § 13-2928(C), on
preemption grounds. See Randal C. Archibold, Judge Blocks Key Parts of Immigration Law in
Arizona, N.Y. TIMES , July 28, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/us/
29arizona.html?_r⫽1&hp.
223. See supra Part I; see also Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (D. Ariz.
2008). It is also important to note that Judge Bolton’s ruling preliminarily enjoining A.R.S.
§ 13-2928(C) also stated that First Amendment challenges to A.R.S. §§ 13-2928(A) and (B) have
been foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach.
See United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980, 1000 n.16 (D. Ariz. 2010).
224. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-2.
225. See Complaint at 1, United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980 (D. Ariz. July 6, 2010) (No.
2:10CV01413), 2010 WL 2653363.
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preempted by federal law.226 Although the fact that the federal government
sued the State of Arizona in order to halt implementation of its immigration
regulation is notable in and of itself,227 the DOJ’s strategy for attacking
Section 5 makes it clear that the federal government views Arizona’s attempt
to regulate solicitation speech as a “backdoor” regulation of immigration that
conflicts with federal law, which is a novel approach for challenging state and
local anti-solicitation laws targeted at day laborers and immigrant workers.
The federal government’s preemption challenge to Arizona’s antisolicitation law is a significant departure from previous challenges to laws
attempting to regulate the solicitation of employment in public fora. This is
because, rather than contending that Arizona’s anti-solicitation law violates
the First Amendment free speech rights of day laborers and others who wish
to solicit work, the DOJ argues instead that “Arizona’s new prohibition on
unauthorized aliens seeking or performing work is preempted by the comprehensive federal scheme of sanctions related to the employment of unauthorized aliens—including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324c.”228 Specifically, the DOJ
argues that the criminal provisions of Section 5 upset the careful balance
Congress has attempted to strike regarding the employment of unauthorized
aliens and the appropriate sanctions that should be leveled against employers
in light of overall federal immigration law and policy.229

226. The other lawsuit challenging Section 5, Friendly House v. Whiting, was filed by a coalition
of civil rights groups and challenges Section 5 on First Amendment grounds rather than federal
preemption grounds. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
227. The federal government’s lawsuit against Arizona seeking to halt S.B. 1070, while a
significant policy matter, is not unprecedented. See, e.g., United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19533 at *1 (C.D. Ill., 2009) (ordering injunction prohibiting State of Illinois from
implementing its mandate, on preemption grounds, that state employer may not participate in the
federal employment verification system known as “E-Verify” until the error rate regarding “tentative
non-confirmations” was significantly lower than at present).
228. See Complaint, supra note 225, at 21. The federal government’s challenge to Section 5 of
S.B. 1070 as preempted by federal sanctions regarding the employment of unauthorized aliens
pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) is also notable due to the United
States Supreme Court’s recent grant of certiorari in another case involving Arizona’s attempt to
regulate immigration at the state level. See Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th
Cir. 2009), cert. granted 130 S.Ct. 3498 (U.S. June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115). The petitioners argue that
Arizona’s statewide employer sanctions law, the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), is preempted
by the federal employer sanctions schemed prescribed for in IRCA. See Brief for the Petitioners at 20,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Candelaria, No. 09-115 (U.S. Sept. 1,
2010) 2010 WL 3483324 at *20. Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found Arizona’s employer sanctions law to be preempted by IRCA. See Arizona Contractors Ass’n,
Inc. v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Ariz. 2007) aff ’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v.
Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008) opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 558
F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009) and aff ’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856
(9th Cir. 2009).
229. See Complaint, supra note 225, at 21. (“The text, structure, history, and purpose of [the
federal employer sanctions] scheme reflect an affirmative decision by Congress to regulate the
employment of unlawful aliens by imposing sanctions on the employer without imposing sanctions
on the unlawful alien employee. Arizona’s criminal sanction on unauthorized aliens stands as an
obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress’s considered approach to regulating
employment practices concerning unauthorized aliens, and it conflicts with Congress’s decision not
to criminalize such conduct for humanitarian and other reasons. Enforcement of this new state crime
additionally interferes with the comprehensive system of civil consequences for aliens unlawfully
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The decision of the DOJ to ground its challenge to Section 5 in a
preemption argument, rather than a First Amendment argument, is almost
certainly based on the fact that the challenge to S.B. 1070 was brought on
behalf of the government rather than private individuals, as had been the case
in all previous successful challenges to anti-solicitation laws.230 The government’s argument that Section 5 is preempted by the federal employer
sanctions scheme provided for in IRCA231—the success of which will
ultimately turn on whether or not a statewide anti-solicitation ordinance that
provides for criminal penalties is really a “regulation of immigration” rather
than an exercise of Arizona’s historic police power232—was a risky one.
However, United States District Judge Susan R. Bolton’s acceptance of the
government’s argument that “Plaintiff is likely to succeed on its claim that
Arizona’s new crime for working without authorization, set forth in Section
5(C) of S.B. 1070, conflicts with a comprehensive federal scheme and is
preempted,”233 exposes one of the potential flaws in the strategic decision
litigation decisions day laborer advocates have made in the past regarding
challenging anti-solicitation ordinances—the decision to solely challenge
such laws on First Amendment grounds rather than or in addition to a federal
preemption theory. As Judge Bolton’s reasoning in her decision granting the
government’s request to enjoin the anti-solicitation provision of S.B. 1070
demonstrates,234 perhaps the inclusion of a preemption theory in previous
challenges to anti-solicitation laws would have allowed day labor advocates
to frame the issue not only as one of free speech, but as an attack on these
types of laws for what they really are—attempts by local government to
circumvent federal immigration law with their own regulations of immigration.
2. Friendly House v. Whiting
The other lawsuit challenging Section 5 of S.B. 1070 is Friendly House v.

present in the United States by attaching criminal sanctions on the conditions of unlawful presence,
despite an affirmative choice by Congress not to criminalize unlawful presence.”).
230. See supra Part I.
231. See Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support
Thereof at 42–43, United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-1413NVW) (“Section 5 of S.B. 1070, which establishes criminal penalties for unlawfully present aliens
who solicit or perform work in Arizona, is preempted by Congress’s comprehensive scheme, set forth
in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), for regulating the employment of
aliens . . . IRCA does not criminalize the mere performance or solicitation of work by an unlawfully
present alien.”).
232. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976); see also Chicanos Por La Causa v.
Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 864 (2009).
233. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980, 1002 (D. Ariz. 2010).
234. Judge Bolton only enjoined the anti-solicitation provision of Section 5, A.R.S. § 132928(C), “creating a crime for an unauthorized alien to solicit, apply for, or perform work.” She did
not grant the government’s request to enjoin the first two provisions of Section 5, A.R.S. § 13-2928(A)(B), “creating a crime for stopping a motor vehicle to pick up day laborers and for day laborers to get
in a motor vehicle if it impedes the normal movement of traffic.” Id. at 1008.
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Whiting,235 which was filed by a coalition of civil rights groups on behalf of
various individuals and organizations. Like previous challenges to antisolicitation ordinances, the Friendly House lawsuit attacks Section 5 on the
grounds that it violates the First Amendment.236 The plaintiffs contend that
the statewide ban on solicitation is a content-based restriction on speech
because “it singles out solicitation speech, a ‘particular content for differential treatment.’”237 The plaintiffs also argue that “the law’s sweeping prohibition is . . . unsupportable because it prohibits protected and peaceful solicitations of independent contracting work and temporary, informal work that are
permissible under federal law.”238
In the alternative, the plaintiffs state that even if Section 5 is a contentneutral regulation, it is still unconstitutional because “it burdens substantially
more speech than is necessary to further any significant governmental
interest [and] . . . it is not narrowly tailored to serve any government interest.”239 In addition to challenging the portion of Section 5 that prohibits
solicitation of employment, A.R.S. § 13-2928(C), both Friendly House and
U.S. v. Arizona also contend that A.R.S. §§ 13-2928(A) and (B), which make
it unlawful for a person in a vehicle “to attempt to hire or hire” day laborers
and for persons to enter a car “in order to be hired,”240 are unconstitutional.241 Therefore, although proceeding on the traditional First Amendment
theory of litigation to challenge Section 5, like the lawsuit filed by the DOJ,
the Friendly House litigation reinforces the principle that the state of
Arizona’s attempt to prohibit the solicitation of employment is a “backdoor”
regulation of immigration targeted at one specific group—day laborers.242

235. Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Friendly House v. Whiting, 2:10-cv01061-MEA (D. Ariz. May 17, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/az_sb1070_
complaint_20100517.pdf.
236. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support at 28,
Friendly House v. Whiting, 2:10-cv-01061-MEA (D. Ariz. June 6, 2010), available at http://www.
aclu.org/files/assets/2010-6-21-FriendlyHousevWhiting-MotionforPI.pdf.
237. Id. at 29 (citing Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009)).
238. See id. (citing Berger, 569 F.3d at 1052–53). The argument identified by plaintiffs in the
Friendly House lawsuit, that solicitation of employment in public fora is “temporary, informal work
that is permissible under federal law,” refers to 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f), (h), (j) (2009), which expressly
exempt work performed by such individuals from the federal definition of “employee,” is also the
biggest weakness in the DOJ’s argument that Section 5 is preempted by the federal employer
sanctions law. Compare id. at 28–29, n.25 with Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and
Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof, supra note 231, at 42–44.
239. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, supra note
236, at 29 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) and Lopez v. Town of Cave
Creek, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1035 (D. Ariz. 2008)).
240. ARIZ. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-2928(A)-(B) (2010).
241. Although both lawsuits argue the unconstitutionality of the hiring provisions of Section 5,
like the respective challenges to the prohibition on solicitation of employment, the government’s
lawsuit sought to invalidate the hiring provision on preemption grounds and the civil rights
coalition’s lawsuit is grounded in a First Amendment theory. Compare Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof, supra note 231, at 11–12, with
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, supra note 236, at 28.
242. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, supra note
236, at 29–32.
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However, in her order enjoining portions of S.B. 1070, Judge Bolton
declined to enjoin either A.R.S. §§ 13-2928(A) or (B) on First Amendment
grounds, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Redondo Beach.243
While certainly not the last word on the subject—especially given the fact
that the plaintiffs in the Redondo Beach litigation have sought review of the
panel’s decision en banc244—Judge Bolton’s decision not to enjoin the hiring
provisions of S.B. 1070 does not bode well for the litigation strategy relied
upon by day labor advocates over the past decade in challenging antisolicitation laws. This is because, while it is beyond dispute that First
Amendment challenges to bans on the solicitation of employment have
yielded legal victories for day laborers, the lack of systemic change for
persons who wish to seek work in public fora remains a concern. Despite
court decisions vindicating the right of day laborers and others to engage in
solicitation speech in public as protected free speech activity going back at
least a decade,245 local governments have continued to pass anti-solicitation
ordinances that they could attempt to justify as necessitated by a significant
government interest, and that were also constitutionally permissible contentneutral regulations on the time, place, and manner of speech.246 Without the
ability to rely on solid case law from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—
which until the Redondo Beach decision had created a good foundation for
challenging anti-solicitation ordinances as content-based restrictions on
speech—day laborers and their allies may find it necessary to embrace other
legal theories besides their First Amendment free speech rights in order to
assure their continued ability to solicit employment in public fora.
Finally, given the persistence of anti-solicitation ordinances, despite legal
precedent invalidating such laws as unconstitutional, the question arises—
why do day labor advocates continue to attack such laws under a First
Amendment free speech theory? To this day, challenges to anti-solicitation
ordinances across the country are being filed solely or primarily on First
Amendment grounds,247 even though such suits have not given rise to much
positive legal precedent outside of the Ninth Circuit.248 Additionally, such
litigation has borne little fruit in terms of creating a lasting impact on the
lives of day laborers and their ability to solicit work free from harassment by
law enforcement and local government. Considering the government’s recent
success in obtaining a preliminary injunction against the anti-solicitation

243. United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp. 2d 980, 1000 n.16 (D. Ariz. 2010) (citing Comite de
Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178, 1184–93 (9th Cir. 2010)).
244. See Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 607 F.3d 1178
(No. 06-56869).
245. See, e.g., CHIRLA, 2000 WL 1481467 at *13.
246. See supra Part I.
247. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support, supra note
236, at 1; see also Complaint, supra note 144, at 1.
248. The notable exception is Doe v. City of Mamaroneck, 462. F.Supp.2d 520, 550 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
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portion of S.B. 1070 on preemption grounds, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s
recent rejection of the First Amendment theories advanced in Redondo
Beach, it is worth thinking critically about the legal strategies that should be
implemented in advocacy on behalf of day laborers in the future.
3. What is the Best Strategy for Future Challenges to “Backdoor”
Immigration Regulations?
Going forward, it is worth exploring other potential avenues for litigation
challenging anti-solicitation ordinances and other “backdoor” immigration
regulations—perhaps in addition to First Amendment claims—that may
provide additional, more meaningful remedies for those who wish to solicit
employment in public fora.249 While it is far from certain that other legal
strategies will ultimately yield more practical success in improving the lives
of day laborers in the long-term, the fact that the Arizona legislature chose to
include Section 5 in S.B. 1070, the stated purpose of which is to enforce
immigration law,250 evinces the intent of the state of Arizona to create a state
law targeting day laborers that is, for all intents and purposes, a regulation of
immigration. Given the national temperament surrounding the debate around
“illegal” immigration, there is no reason to believe that these types of
state-level attempts to regulate immigration will end with Arizona, nor is
there any reason to believe that future laws will not target high-profile
immigrant workers such as day laborers.251
Attacking anti-solicitation laws as an infringement on day laborers’ First
Amendment free speech rights, while underscoring the importance of extending civil rights protections to all persons regardless of the message, does not
really address the root problems that give rise to these type of “backdoor”
immigration regulations. At the same time, neither does the government’s
preemption theory relied upon in United States v. Arizona address the
inherently problematic nature of such regulations, although the government’s

249. See infra Part V.
250. See S.B. 49-170, 2d Sess., § 1 (Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/
2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf (“The legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the cooperative
enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout all of Arizona. The legislature declares that the
intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local
government agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this act are intended to work together to
discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons
unlawfully present in the United States.”) (emphasis added).
251. Arizona state senator Russell Pearce, the sponsor of S.B. 1070, has already indicated that he
intends to introduce more bills targeted at regulating immigration at the state level when the
legislature reconvenes. See, e.g., Morgan Loew, “Anchor Babies” Could Be Ariz.’s Next Target:
Immigration Enforcement Debate May Not Stop With SB 1070, KPHO CBS5, May 24, 2010,
available at http://www.kpho.com/news/23623047/detail.html; see also Marcelo Ballvé, Arizona’s
Immigration Law Spurs Copycat Legislation, NEW AMERICA MEDIA, May 3, 2010, available at
http://newamericamedia.org/2010/05/arizonas-immigration-law-spurs-copycat-legislation.php (noting that legislators in “at least 10 states—Utah, Oklahoma, Colorado, Ohio, Missouri, Georgia, South
Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, and Maryland—have called for laws that would mirror Arizona’s Senate
Bill 1070”).
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theory does come closer than the First Amendment theory of litigation to
naming these types of regulations as immigration laws in disguise. The heart
of the matter is that anti-solicitation laws use immigration status—real or
perceived—as a proxy for discrimination on impermissible grounds, such as
race and ethnicity. Indeed, other commentators have noted that these types of
“backdoor” immigration regulations are, at heart, equal protection issues.
However, advocates have shied away from filing legal challenges grounded
in equal protection theories because they have not been as successful as
challenges rooted in the First Amendment and federal preemption.252 Therefore, whether future lawsuits continue to be based on free speech rights for
day laborers or begin to embrace the theory of preemption put forth by the
federal government in the Arizona litigation, the question going forward is
how to craft creative, yet effective, legal challenges to anti-solicitation
ordinances that not only bring success in the courtroom, but success “on the
corner,” as well.
V.

LOOKING FORWARD: TURNING LEGAL SUCCESS INTO MEANINGFUL CHANGE
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF DAY LABORERS’ CIVIL RIGHTS

Since the early 2000s, day laborers and immigrant worker advocates have
worked together to implement a multi-pronged litigation and public awareness campaign about the right of individuals to solicit employment in public
fora, free from harassment by both law enforcement and the general public.
However, as this article notes, day laborers have not been able to translate
their litigation victories into long-term, systemic changes that improve the
quality of life of day laborers and allow them to attempt to earn a living
without undue interference. Although strides have been made through the
advent of city-sponsored day labor centers and the like,253 most day laborers
continue to solicit employment without the benefit of organization, and
without the relative safety and security provided by such locations. In the
absence of large-scale organization of day laborers—which is unlikely to
happen, given the inherently transitory and temporary nature of day work—
this section attempts to identify a few strategies for qualitatively improving
the quality of life of day laborers through the law, outside of and in addition
to the traditional First Amendment litigation strategies that have been
employed thus far.

252. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration
Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723 (2010) (discussing how litigation strategies on behalf of
immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants, may focus on procedural rather than substantive
challenges to immigration regulations and how such decisions reflect “a pervasive national ambivalence” about immigration law and policy).
253. See Baldwin Park Repeals Day Laborer Limitation Law supra note 26; see also infra Part
V.B.; discussion supra Part I.B.4.
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A. Organizing to Enforce State and Federal Labor Laws
One of the most difficult aspects of protecting the rights of day laborers is
the vulnerability that is part and parcel of making oneself available for day
work. The short-term nature of day labor, the terms of which are almost
always negotiated on the corner or in a vehicle, makes it very difficult to
ensure that the work day laborers are agreeing to perform and the wage they
have been promised is actually what is expected of them when they arrive at
the worksite. Additionally, the potential danger involved for the day laborers
in soliciting and accepting work from strangers—who also normally provide
the transportation to and from the worksite—underscores the lack of oversight and potential remedies available to day laborers if, for one reason or
another, the terms of employment they agreed to are not adhered to by an
unscrupulous employer.254
Day laborers can learn a lot from some of the advocacy campaigns of other
low-wage immigrant workers. One idea for translating the success of their
First Amendment litigation into real change on the ground is potential
collaboration with other groups of exploited workers. One of the most
successful recent campaigns by low-wage, largely immigrant workers occurred with the organization of car wash workers in and around Los Angeles,
California.255 The “carwasheros,” who often worked only for tips and
without breaks in hazardous conditions,256 organized with the help of the
UCLA Downtown Labor Center, the AFL-CIO, and attorneys from the
Employment Project at Bet Tzedek Legal Services.257 Relying on a state law
that had been passed in 2004 guaranteeing certain rights to car workers, the
“carwasheros” worked together with legal advocates and mounted a public
campaign against targeted car washes that included boycotts and picketing.258 Ultimately, the car wash campaign ended up with civil and criminal
charges filed against the owners of several car washes for violating state

254. Although I use the term “employer” when discussing the relationship between day laborers
and the persons for whom they perform work, it is important to note that because of the brief and
casual nature of day work, day laborers are usually not considered “employees,” but rather are
independent contractors in the eyes of the law. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(g), (j) (2009).
255. See JUSTICE FOR CAR WASH WORKERS, CLEAN CAR WASH CAMPAIGN, http://www.
cleancarwashla.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
256. See id. (“Carwashes routinely violate basic employment laws like those requiring workers
be permitted to take rest breaks or have access to shade and clean drinking water. Workers frequently
work 10 hours a day, 6 days a week, often with no overtime pay. Workers are often paid less than the
legal minimum wage, sometimes earning as little as $30–$40 per day ($3–$4/ hour) or working for
tips alone. Carwash workers are subject to health and safety hazards such as constant exposure to
water and to dangerous chemicals without protective gear. Workers in the industry have reported
kidney damage, respiratory problems and nerve damage due to their exposure to these hazards.”).
257. See CLEAN Members, JUSTICE FOR CAR WASH WORKERS, CLEAN CAR WASH CAMPAIGN,
http://www.cleancarwashla.org/index.cfm?action⫽cat&categoryID⫽5abd8d03-bff7-4e5e-a7d11abcd6edf4b3 (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
258. See Boycott List, JUSTICE FOR CAR WASH WORKERS, CLEAN CAR WASH CAMPAIGN,
http://www.cleancarwashla.org/index.cfm?action⫽cat&categoryID⫽51badd85-1542-4813-999bc3860ee7bfa4 (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
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laws.259 Although there is still a lot of work to be done to reform the car wash
industry,260 the success of the carwasheros in advocating for greater protection and oversight of the car wash industry is perhaps something that day
laborers can learn from and implement into their own advocacy strategies
going forward.
B. Continued Cooperation with Big Box Stores, Local Government, and
Law Enforcement
One of the most exciting recent developments in day labor advocacy was
the passage of a Los Angeles ordinance in 2009 that requires all new “big
box” stores within Los Angeles city limits—such as Lowe’s, Best Buy, and
other locations where day laborers often make themselves available for
work—to have a day laborer center on site for individuals to solicit employment and for potential employers to find willing workers.261 These types of
laws, along with the continued cooperation of local government and law
enforcement officials to ensure that day laborers are able to solicit employment in public in a safe environment, can be useful tools for day laborers in
addition to the continued challenges of anti-solicitation laws targeted at day
laborers. Though it remains a struggle for day laborers to continue to gain
acceptance from the general public, the alliance of day laborers and the
businesses where they solicit employment can have the positive effect of
reducing the need or desire for law enforcement presence in and around
home improvement stores, while also underscoring the legitimacy of the
solicitation of employment as expressive activity that is worthy of accommodation and not “trespassing” or “vagrancy.”
CONCLUSION
The struggle for day laborer civil rights has been a long and hard battle.
Although there is still much work to be done, great strides have been made by
day laborers and their advocates over the last decade to ensure that day
laborers can continue to earn a living by soliciting work in traditional public
fora, free from harassment by both law enforcement and individuals who are
opposed to the presence of day laborers in their community. On the legal
front, precedential cases have been won by day laborers that have enshrined
259. See Karmel Melamud, Car Wash Brothers Face Labor Abuse Charges, JEWISH JOURNAL
(Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.jewishjournal.com/community/article/car_wash_brothers_face_labor_
abuse_charges_20090422/.
260. In October 2009, the California state law protecting car wash workers from abuse was
extended to October 15, 2014. See Doug Cunningham, Carwash Workers in California Get Protection
Law Extended—10/15/09, WORKERS INDEP. NEWS (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.laborradio.org/node/
12157.
261. See Los Angeles Passes Day Laborer Ordinance, STANDING FIRM (Aug. 14, 2008),
http://standing-firm.com/2008/08/14/update-los-angeles-passes-day-laborer-ordinance/ (stating that
“[t]he Los Angeles City Council has approved an ordinance that could be used to require home
improvement stores to provide shelter, water and bathrooms for day laborers looking for work”).
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their First Amendment right to solicit employment as constitutionally protected speech, and have even expanded the doctrine to include the analysis of
anti-solicitation ordinances as content-based restrictions on speech.262 Unfortunately, if there is to be meaningful and lasting change for day laborers’ right
to solicit work in public peaceably, a new litigation and advocacy strategy
must be forged. With a new decade upon us, and new challenges to the civil
rights of day laborers arising every day, it will take creativity in addition to
courage for day laborers and their advocates to move the struggle for equality
beyond the corner and into the mainstream of American life.

262.

View publication stats

See supra Part I.

